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TO THE VICTOR GOES THE TOIL—REMEDIES 
FOR REGULATED PARTIES IN SEPARATION-
OF-POWERS LITIGATION* 
KENT BARNETT** 
The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of 
federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed, 
the extent of their independence from the President, and the 
range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the 
importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the 
Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these 
safeguards through implied private rights of action under the 
Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been 
successfully challenging agency structure with increased 
frequency—as the recent ongoing separation-of-powers actions 
against the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) indicate. At 
the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely 
ignored the practical question of “structural remedies”—i.e., how 
to remedy the violation of structural safeguards for prevailing 
regulated parties. This inattention may arise because courts often 
provide what seems at first blush to be an appropriate remedy: 
severing the structural defect from an agency’s “organic” act. In 
fact, however, structural remedies often fail to satisfy core 
remedial values relevant to regulated parties—namely, 
compensating past harm, preventing future harm from the past 
defect, incentivizing regulated parties to seek redress, and 
deterring structural violations—and may even leave regulated 
parties in a worse place than they occupied before asserting the 
challenge. These ineffectual remedies thereby undermine the very 
safeguards that judicial decisions purport to vindicate and render 
any “private right” potentially illusory. Courts, in response, can 
improve the status quo. They could select (or Congress could 
provide) better remedies, and this Article considers how they 
could do so. But if structural remedies cannot be sufficiently 
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improved, courts should either become more candid about the 
underlying safeguards’ limitations or reconsider altogether the 
nature of the safeguards and regulated parties’ relationship to 
them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Next to a battle lost, the greatest misery is a battle gained.” 
-Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington1 
For nearly two decades, the United States Supreme Court has 
welcomed regulated parties’ separation-of-powers challenges to the 
federal administrative state. These constitutional challenges include 
efforts to limit agencies’ power based upon the Appointments Clause, 
the President’s implied supervisory powers under Article II, and the 
judiciary’s powers under Article III.2 The Court has indicated that 
prevailing litigants are entitled to a meaningful remedy3 and has 
recognized private rights of action under the Constitution to assert 
these structural challenges.4 Parties that are regulated by federal 
administrative agencies have noted the Court’s apparent enthusiasm 
and have begun regularly asserting these and other structural 
challenges, including recent ones based on the President’s recess 
appointments of certain members to the NLRB and the director of 
the CFPB.5 But prevailing regulated parties often obtain not only an 
unsatisfactory judicial remedy, but one that may place them in an 
even worse position than the one they occupied before bringing suit. 
The remedies, too, may be ill-defined and may fail to resolve what 
effect a separation-of-powers violation has on other agency actions 
and other regulated parties. These remedial deficiencies result from 
the failure to consider familiar remedial values when crafting 
remedies for structural or systemic violations to the administrative 
 
 1. FRANCES SPALDING, JOHN PIPER, MYFANWY PIPER: LIVES IN ART 433 (2009). 
 2. Other structural challenges exist, but they are much less common. See generally 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (concerning the “legislative veto”); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (concerning the nondelegation 
doctrine). The remedies for these challenges are less troubling than the remedies for 
successful structural challenges discussed in this Article because the prevailing party 
obtains meaningful substantive relief. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928 (invalidating 
congressional action that would have led to the immigrant’s deportation); Schechter, 295 
U.S. at 551 (reversing the defendants’ conviction). 
 3. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 188 (1995). 
 4. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 
n.2 (2010). 
 5. See generally New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010) (holding that 
the NLRB lacked a quorum under the governing statute to act); Noel Canning v. NLRB, 
705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the recess appointments of NLRB members 
were unconstitutional), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 2861 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281); 
Richards v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing a challenge to recess 
appointments based on lack of standing); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 240–45, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032 
(D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 4229466 (asserting several structural challenges to the 
CFPB). 
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state. This failure, in turn, limits the efficacy of the very structural 
safeguards that courts purport to vindicate. 
For a concrete sense of the problem, consider the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.6 There, 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) had 
begun investigating the auditing practices of the plaintiff, an 
accounting firm.7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) established the 
board as an independent entity within the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), itself an independent agency, to regulate 
accounting and auditing firms.8 The SEC appointed the board’s 
members and could remove them for certain causes.9 The plaintiff 
argued that the board’s independence improperly impeded the 
President’s supervisory powers under Article II.10 The Court agreed, 
holding that the board members enjoyed too much protection from 
at-will removal.11 However, the Court did not prevent the board from 
taking any actions under SOX, as the plaintiffs had requested.12 
Instead, it simply severed the board members’ statutory protection 
from removal from office by the SEC, rendering them removable at 
will and thus sufficiently subject to presidential oversight to cure the 
structural defect.13 The Court remanded the matter to the board for 
further proceedings,14 declaring SOX “fully operative.”15 
This remedy might seem proportionate to the violation. By 
permitting the SEC to remove the board members at will, the Court 
addressed the structural harm in the statutory scheme. Invalidating all 
of the board’s powers would seem too severe a sanction when the 
Court could easily sever the offending provision. The remedy also 
 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 3149. 
 8. Id. at 3147. 
 9. Id. at 3147–48. These causes that served as the basis for removal proceedings were 
that the [PCAOB] member “(A) has willfully violated any provision of th[e SOX] 
Act, the rules of the Board, of the securities laws; (B) has willfully abused the 
authority of that members; or (C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has 
failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional 
standard by any registered public accounting firm or associated person thereof.” 
Id. at 3148 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3)(2006). 
 10. Id. at 3149. 
 11. See id. at 3151–61. 
 12. See id. at 3161. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. at 3164. 
 15. Id. at 3161 (internal quotations omitted). 
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appeared to comport with settled norms of judicial restraint and 
attentiveness to Congress’s likely fallback position.16 
But the remedy from the prevailing litigant’s vantage point looks 
different. Despite the firm’s successful structural challenge, the Court 
provided an inconsequential remedy. It did not prevent the board 
from functioning, invalidate any past actions of the board,17 enjoin the 
board from investigating the regulated firm, require a wholly new 
administrative investigation, or limit the board’s substantive powers.18 
The accounting firm recovered no damages or attorneys’ fees, despite 
the availability of such compensation in other constitutional 
litigation.19 Instead, the investigation simply continued with 
proceedings, at least in the firm’s view, before potentially hostile 
board members who were now stripped of independence from the 
SEC and the President. Whether the board members would actually 
retaliate against the firm hardly matters to a regulated party; the mere 
risk of subtle retaliation is likely enough to counsel caution. 
Ultimately, the prevailing litigant incurred significant costs only to 
end up where it began, except this time before a potentially resentful 
board. The accounting firm could be forgiven for wondering why it 
brought a structural challenge at all. And future litigants—especially 
those that repeatedly interact with an agency—might think it wise to 
ignore other structural defects. 
Consider, too, the remedy from Congress’s perspective. Congress 
created the PCAOB and impinged upon the President’s supervisory 
power. But Congress paid little, if any, price for its constitutional 
violation. The board lost no substantive powers, and the Court did 
not task Congress with rethinking the board’s structure. Despite 
losing the power to structure the administrative state in a particular 
way, Congress paid no serious price for establishing an 
unconstitutional agency. Indeed, after Free Enterprise Fund, 
substantive decisions remain shielded from the President’s control. In 
 
 16. See id.; Brianne J. Gorod, The Collateral Consequences of Ex Post Judicial Review, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 903, 952–53 (2013). 
 17. In Free Enterprise Fund, the agency had not yet issued a final order. See Free 
Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150–51 (permitting review of the constitutional issue despite no 
final agency action). 
 18. See infra Part III for a discussion of remedies in other separation-of-powers 
litigation. 
 19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (2006) (permitting damages and attorneys’ fees 
for federal law violations by those acting under color of state law); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390–97 (1971) (providing damages against federal officers 
for Fourth Amendment violations). 
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light of the Court’s remedy, future Congresses may wonder why they 
should bother considering structural matters. 
Buckley v. Valeo20 illustrates similar points. There, the Court 
held that all members of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) 
were installed in violation of the Appointments Clause.21 The 
prevailing parties requested that the Court shut down the FEC and 
invalidate all of its powers and prior actions.22 The Court, however, 
while invalidating the FEC’s future exercise of “executive” powers, 
validated the agency’s past actions.23 The parties, despite prevailing, 
were thus bound by an unconstitutionally constituted body’s actions. 
Moreover, the Court stayed its judgment for thirty days, permitting 
the FEC to wield its original powers during that transitive period in 
which Congress could consider how to restructure the Commission.24 
Put simply, the Court permitted what was probably the most 
structurally defective agency ever created to continue to act and 
validated its past actions.25 
Free Enterprise Fund and Buckley are not aberrational. Other 
decisions’ remedies for systemic violations reveal similar 
deficiencies.26 These problems, too, are almost sure to proliferate 
because of the increased frequency of structural challenges by 
regulated parties, the Court’s increasingly formal separation-of-
powers doctrines, and Congress’s failure to comply with structural 
safeguards when fashioning administrative structures in the recent 
past.27 Indeed, aside from the challenges discussed in detail later in 
this Article, regulated parties have recently (and sometimes 
successfully) asserted separation-of-powers challenges against the 
CFPB and the NLRB to prevent the agencies from acting, but they 
have done so without confronting the possibility of receiving an 
inadequate remedy.28 When successful, these parties have not 
 
 20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 21. See id. at 140. 
 22. See id. at 140. 
 23. See id. at 137–42. 
 24. See id. at 143. 
 25. See infra note 291. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part I. 
 28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; First Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 240–45, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, 
No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 4229466; Brief and Required 
Appendix of Petitioner at 56, Richards v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-
1973 & 12-1984) (petitioner’s brief requesting that the court remand the matter for action 
only when the NLRB had a proper quorum); Jim Puzzanghera, Lawsuit Challenges 
Consumer Protection Bureau, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com 
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obtained clear remedial guidance from the courts,29 revealing the 
timeliness and importance of discussing judicial remedies for 
structural violations.30 There is, too, a deeper problem: the parties 
rarely brief the issue of remedies in any detail, and the courts rarely 
even consider remedial alternatives or the normative goals that they 
have recognized in other settings as critical for fashioning proper 
remedies.31 Given the inextricable connection between rights and 
remedies,32 the courts’ actions raise broad questions about the 
meaningfulness and nature of the substantive limits that they have 
imposed on administrative agencies’ structure. 
Nor are the courts and parties alone in ignoring remedies. In the 
1950s, Professor Charles Alan Wright remarked upon the academy’s 
failure to consider the law of remedies.33 In the decades since, 
scholars have considered judicial remedies for constitutional 
 
/2012/jun/22/business/la-fi-banks-lawsuit-20120623; Kevin Bogardus, Senate Republicans 
Join Suit Against NLRB Recess Appointments, THE HILL (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/258843-senate-republicans-join-suit-against-nlrb-
recess-appointments (discussing a recess-appointment challenge brought in the D.C. 
Circuit). 
 29. See generally Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the recess appointments of NLRB members were unconstitutional but providing no 
remedial discussion), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 2861 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281). 
Before the Senate confirmed Richard Cordray as director of the CFPB in July 2013, see 
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, Vote Number 174, U.S. SENATE 
(July 16, 2013), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm 
?congress=113&session=1&vote=00174, legal blogs noted the uncertainty that a successful 
challenge to his recess appointment would have faced, see Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Senate 
Republicans Officially Weigh In On Cordray’s Nomination, CFPB MONITOR BLOG (Feb. 
1, 2013), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/02/01/the-senate-republicans-officially-weigh-
in-on-cordrays-nomination/. 
 30. Commentators have begun to notice these remedial concerns in separation-of-
powers litigation. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, D.C. Circuit May Soon Invalidate President 
Obama’s NLRB Recess Appointments: Implications for CFPB, CFPB MONITOR BLOG 
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/01/10/d-c-court-of-appeals-may-soon-
invalidate-president-obamas-nlrb-recess-appointments-implications-for-cfpb/ (“Would any 
or all of the CFPB’s actions since Mr. Cordray was appointed be invalid? How do you 
unscramble the egg? What about future CFPB actions?”). 
 31. For instance, courts consider the values of deterrence and compensation in tort 
and contract matters, see generally infra Part II.B, and they consider deterrence, incentive 
to litigate, and other values when fashioning injunctions for violations of certain 
constitutional rights, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1355, 1358 (1991). 
 32. See infra Part II.A; cf. RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 59 
(5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he precise remedy sought by the parties and awarded by the court will 
reveal important information about the formation of contract.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 931 n.317 (1999) 
(referring to Lon Fuller’s contracts casebook that began by discussing remedies). 
 33. See Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. 
L.J. 376, 376 (1955). 
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violations, but they have generally concentrated on federalism 
concerns over injunctions triggered by state and municipal violations 
of specific constitutional amendments.34 Some recent scholarship 
considers the proper role of injunctive relief for all constitutional 
violations35 and the potential for remedial nuance to mitigate the 
consequences of invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds 
generally.36 But none of this work has broadly considered the kind of 
remedies that a regulated party should receive for successfully 
challenging the structure of the administrative state.37 This omission is 
problematic because, as explored below, structural challenges have 
characteristics that render an effective remedy for a prevailing 
regulated party difficult to craft. Likewise, scholars have considered 
the effect of the Court’s recent separation-of-powers jurisprudence on 
the competing branches of government or constitutional theory.38 But 
they have not considered a more important problem to those under 
regulatory supervision: whether the Court’s structural remedies for 
regulated parties render the substantive norms practically ineffective. 
 
 34. For scholarly discussion of the federalism implications of injunctive relief, see 
generally Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: the Constitution as a Sword, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1979); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); Alfred 
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Levinson, supra note 32; 
Henry P. Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); 
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); Sturm, supra note 
31.  
 35. See John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 5 (2013). 
 36. See Gorod, supra note 16, at 949–51. 
 37. The key exception is scholarship that has considered the de facto officer doctrine’s 
proper role in remedying invalid appointments. See infra Part III.B. But see Michael Dorf, 
Toward a Doctrine of “Constitutionalish” Laws, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 17, 2012, 2:30 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/toward-doctrine-of-constitutionalish.html (suggesting 
that structural remedies should be pragmatic and limited for “constitutionalish” laws, 
whose fault is “technical”). 
 38. For examples of such scholarship, see generally Kent Barnett, Avoiding 
Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2012) [hereinafter 
Barnett, Independent Agency]; Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
Appointment with Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, 
Appointment with Trouble]; Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The 
Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2011); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of 
Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-
Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602–03 (2012); Neomi 
Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2011).  
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Against this backdrop, I turn to three familiar values for 
assessing the effectiveness of all remedies, including remedies for 
systemic or structural defect: (1) compensation for and prospective 
enforcement of the violation, (2) incentives to seek redress, and (3) 
deterrence of violators. With these values in mind, I examine six 
leading structural decisions to identify characteristics that often lead 
structural remedies to achieve key remedial values.39 These 
characteristics include requiring Congress or the President to 
confront the structural defect and choose how to respond, providing 
new administrative proceedings for the prevailing party after a court’s 
ruling, and invalidating an agency’s actions taken while improperly 
constituted. 
In light of structural remediation’s deficiencies, courts have three 
choices. First, they can alter structural remedies to correspond with 
the Court’s description of substantive norms and regulated parties’ 
interest in vindicating them. To this end, I discuss possible remedial 
reforms, most of which present their own difficulties. Second, courts 
can candidly recognize that remedial limitations constrict the meaning 
of an underlying safeguard. This option would allow regulated parties 
to decide, with better information, whether structural protections are 
worth vindicating. Finally, courts might reconsider a matter closely 
related to the nature of the safeguard—whether regulated parties’ 
“personal rights” or “interests” in the enforcement of structural 
safeguards should be less significant than the Court’s decisions, at 
times, suggest. In particular, the sometimes awkward fit between 
systemic harms and key remedial values for regulated parties reveals 
that perhaps only the competing branches of government should be 
able to enforce structural safeguards. 
This Article is limited in four key ways. First, despite criticizing 
the Court’s recent separation-of-powers cases elsewhere,40 I accept its 
doctrine here. My purpose is to explore whether judicial remedies 
under that doctrine provide insight into the true nature of structural 
safeguards and how these remedies should be enforced. Second, my 
inquiry, unlike those in related scholarship,41 considers regulated 
 
 39. The term “structural remedy” may connote injunctive relief in public-interest 
litigation, such as with judicial remediation of racial discrimination through school busing 
or of Eighth Amendment violations through judicial oversight of prison administration. I 
use the term here to refer only to remedies to cure structural violations based upon 
Articles II and III of the Constitution. 
 40. See, e.g., Barnett, Independent Agency, supra note 38, at 1350; Barnett, 
Appointment with Trouble, supra note 38, at 1464–69. 
 41. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 16, at 906–10 (discussing the impact of judicial review 
on the legislative branch). 
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parties’ remedies through a theoretical lens that views a remedy’s 
suitability primarily from a regulated party’s vantage point rather 
than that of an affected branch of the federal government. I do not 
assert that such a lens is the only or best way through which to view 
these remedies; instead, it is a helpful yet overlooked tool for 
illuminating the propriety of structural remedies. Other values—such 
as limiting regulatory chaos and considering the proper role of the 
courts, which I mention where relevant—are also important when 
considering a remedy from other perspectives and defining the 
structural safeguard. Third, I recognize the limited number of 
structural challenges by regulated parties from which one can draw 
conclusions. Nonetheless, it is better to consider existing decisions to 
help improve remedies in this burgeoning area of litigation. Finally, 
although I consider three possible responses to insufficient structural 
remedies, I take no position as to the best response, leaving that issue 
for another day. My purpose is only to spur courts, scholars, and 
regulated parties to explore how inadequate structural remedies 
impact underlying norms and to consider key options. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of the three structural safeguards 
that I consider in this Article: Appointments Clause limits, 
presidential-supervision limits, and judicial-authority limits. Part II 
explains why remedial theory matters for those safeguards and 
considers the three key values that structural remedies should serve 
for regulated parties. Part III considers the effectiveness of structural 
remedies with regard to these critical desiderata in six decisions. Part 
IV considers how courts and scholars could respond to limited 
structural remedies. 
I.  CORE STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS 
Most constitutional litigation regarding the federal 
administrative state concerns three safeguards: required methods of 
appointment under the Appointments Clause, the President’s implied 
power to remove executive officers under Article II, and the necessity 
of judicial determination of disputed issues under Article III. This 
Part briefly considers how the Court has approached each of these 
safeguards and regulated parties’ relationships to them. 
The Appointments Clause controls the installation of officers of 
the United States.42 In effect, the clause separates appointees into two 
groups: principal officers and inferior officers. Principal officers, 
 
 42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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based on their lack of subordination to other officers and the 
comparative importance of their duties,43 must be nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.44 Inferior officers must be 
appointed in the same manner as principal officers or, at Congress’s 
election, by the President alone, the heads of executive departments, 
or the courts of law.45 The Supreme Court has stated that these 
specific appointment mechanisms are not mere “etiquette or 
protocol.”46 Instead, they act as a “bulwark against one branch 
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch”47 and 
“preserve[] . . . the Constitution’s structural integrity.”48 The clause 
also prevents the distribution of the appointment power to numerous 
officials, thereby helping ensure that identifiable individuals receive 
the praise or blame for good or bad appointments.49 
These limits on the appointment power inure to the benefit of 
not only the branches of government but also regulated parties.50 Of 
particular importance, the courts have resisted suggestions that only 
the executive branch (or its own delegates) should be able to 
challenge defective appointments through quo warranto 
proceedings.51 
 
 43. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1997); see also Intercollegiate 
Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1337–38 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(noting uncertainty under Supreme Court jurisprudence of whether proper inquiry 
considers subordination and importance), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013) 
(No. 12-928). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 47. Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)). The power to appoint 
heads of executive and independent agencies can be very meaningful. Professor Glen 
Robinson has argued that independent agencies’ agendas “fit closely with presidential 
programs in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations and yet did not require close 
presidential control of the direction of agency decisions. Selective presidential 
intervention through appointments . . . proved remarkably effective.” Glen O. Robinson, 
Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 
250. 
 48. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182; see also Steven J. Duffield & James C. Ho, Comment, 
The (Still) Illegal Appointment of Bill Lann Lee, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 403, 411 (1999) 
(noting that appointments that require senatorial confirmation “protect[] citizens by 
providing an added check against unwarranted government intrusion, ensuring that 
individuals are not vested with the enormous power of the federal government unless 
approved of by both the President and the Senate”). 
 51. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Kathryn 
A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for Continued Application, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1985) (“Andrade faults the de facto officer doctrine for 
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Another key structural safeguard concerns the President’s power 
to supervise executive officers. Although Article II says nothing 
expressly about the President’s removal power,52 the Court has 
understood the “executive power” to carry with it a measure of 
presidential authority to remove executive officers, whether for any 
reason or only for some form of good cause.53 The removal power is a 
safeguard that prevents the diffusion of authority that “would greatly 
diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief 
magistrate himself.”54 Indeed, the Court has referred to the 
President’s supervisory powers over the administrative state as 
“perhaps the key means” of preventing encroachment from the other 
branches on executive authority.55 
The class of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate the President’s 
supervisory powers has been expanding. Officials whom the President 
had removed have long brought, and prevailed in, challenges to the 
President’s supervisory power by obtaining back pay.56 Members of 
other branches of government, too, have prevailed in Article II-based 
challenges to legislation.57 But more recently, regulated parties have 
 
taking insufficient account of ‘the public interest in enforcing legal norms concerning 
eligibility and appointment to office’ . . . .”). Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the 
unanimous opinion in Andrade. See Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1478. 
 52. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3166 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 
(1839)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.29 (1988). 
 53. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47. 
 54. Id. at 3164 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 55. Id. at 3157. 
 56. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 350–51, 356 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619, 632 (1935). Presumably, the removed officer could 
recover money damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). See Tracey A. 
Hardin, Note, Rethinking Independence: The Lack of an Effective Remedy for Improper 
For-Cause Removals, 50 VAND. L. REV. 197, 200, 204 (1997). The remedy for an unlawful 
removal—an award of back pay—generally satisfies the four remedial values. When an 
officer is removed improperly, the President has failed to comply with an implied or 
express statutory requirement that limits his or her removal power in a constitutional 
manner. The monetary award can substantially compensate the removed officer and likely 
provide sufficient incentive to litigate the matter if the compensation is significant. The 
President’s improper removal can also lead to deterrence because of the political price 
that the President may pay for the removal. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (noting how 
“ ‘removal is a doomsday machine’ . . . for presidents” (quoting Paul R. Verkuil, 
Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contracts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 943, 957 (1980))); accord Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s 
Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2477 (2011) (“[T]he 
agency official retains leverage in a particular case to inflict political costs on the President 
by resigning in protest or forcing the President to fire her.”). 
 57. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 (1986). 
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brought challenges based on the President’s removal power.58 The 
Court has not expressly stated that the President’s supervisory powers 
exist to benefit regulated parties. It has, nonetheless, permitted 
regulated parties to challenge restrictions upon the President’s 
supervisory powers even in direct opposition to the government’s 
position in litigation and recognized an implied right of action under 
the Constitution to do so.59 
Finally, the Court has moved to prevent incursions into the 
judiciary’s own constitutional domain. Article III provides that “[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish” and further provides salary protections 
and presumptive life tenure for federal judges.60 The Court has 
referred to separation of powers in the Article III context as “a 
prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions 
because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially 
defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”61 These walls also serve 
as an “inexorable command”62 to ensure that the judiciary is 
independent from the other branches by not having to “curry[] favor” 
with either the legislative or executive branch.63  
Notwithstanding Article III’s protection for the courts, the Court 
has emphasized that the article serves “primarily personal, rather 
than structural, interests.”64 It achieves this goal by ensuring that 
officials insulated from political pressures are assigned the power “to 
say what the law is.”65 The Court has even spoken of regulated 
parties’ interests as “personal right[s]” under Article III.66 
 
 58. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
659–60 (1988). 
 59. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151 n.2; cf. Krent, supra note 38, at 2438 (“The 
President’s Article II powers of appointment and removal are designed not merely to 
augment executive power, but to protect individual liberty.”); accord Harold J. Krent, 
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority 
Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 74 (1990); see also Bond v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“The structural principles secured by the separation of 
powers protect the individual as well.”). 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 61. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (concerning legislation 
that sought to reopen final judgments). 
 62. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) 
(plurality opinion). 
 63. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011). 
 64. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). 
 65. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)). 
 66. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848. 
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The Court’s analytical methods reinforce the idea that all of 
these safeguards are central to administrative structure. First, the 
Court’s structural jurisprudence has relied increasingly upon formal 
analysis,67 ignoring or minimizing functional critiques or problems 
that Congress encounters when establishing administrative entities.68 
The Court has indicated that formal rules provide prophylactic 
devices that better protect the competing branches because functional 
inquiries may lead courts to view transgressions, in isolation, as minor 
or necessary under the seemingly urgent circumstances that surround 
the particular structural innovation.69 By erecting formal doctrines, 
the Court thereby ignores concerns (such as regulated parties’ 
“capture” of the administrative agencies that are meant to regulate 
them70 or certain entities’ comparative subject-matter or other 
administrative advantage71) that may have caused Congress to fashion 
the administrative state in other ways. In short, the Court uses 
formalism, in its view, to strengthen separation-of-powers safeguards 
themselves at the expense of competing concerns. 
 
 67. See, e.g., Barnett, Independent Agency, supra note 38, at 1367–69 (discussing the 
Court’s formalist analysis of the President’s removal power); Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 
38, at 1602; Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: 
Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 405 (2001) (noting a 
more formal analytical turn under the Appointments Clause); Ralph Brubaker, Article 
III’s Bleak House (Part II): The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core 
Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, Sept. 2011, at 1, 6 (2011) (discussing formal 
analysis of Article III limits). 
 68. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3164–84 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (advocating against the formal view taken by 
the Court); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759–75 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the formalistic view taken by the Court). 
 69. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239 (“But the doctrine of separation of powers is a structural 
safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific 
harm, can be identified. In its major features (of which the conclusiveness of judicial 
judgments is assuredly one) it is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear 
distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the 
heat of interbranch conflict.”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the 
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1001 n.48 (2006) (collecting academic justifications 
for formalism in separation-of-powers challenges, most of which turn on the importance of 
having prophylactic protections).  
 70. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 614 (2010) (“Congress established the [PCAOB] as 
an entity within an independent agency, the SEC, to avoid capture by the accounting 
industry.”).  
 71. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2628–29 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that bankruptcy courts could constitutionally decide certain common-law claims 
because, among other reasons, Congress could reasonably seek to allow more complete 
resolution of debtors’ claims in centralized proceedings).  
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Second, the irrelevance of the harmless error doctrine and the 
use of counterfactual scenarios in structural litigation should render 
judicial remediation of structural violations more likely and thereby 
signify the structural safeguards’ importance. Courts can limit 
remedies for constitutional violations by turning either to the 
harmless error doctrine, which requires a showing of actual prejudice 
for judicial remediation, or to likely counterfactual scenarios, which 
consider whether the regulated party would likely be in the same 
place even had no constitutional violation occurred. For instance, 
before suppressing evidence for Fourth Amendment violations, 
courts will consider both actual harm to the challenging criminal 
defendant or counterfactuals to determine whether the police would 
“inevitably” have legally discovered evidence that, in fact, was 
illegally obtained.72 But the courts have held that these doctrines that 
limit judicial remedies have little, if any, relevance to structural 
violations.73 By ignoring questions of harm in the structural context, 
the courts signal that a remedy should be more easily forthcoming for 
structural violations. As I discuss in more detail in Part II.A, with the 
availability of a more meaningful remedy comes a more meaningful 
right.74 
Yet, despite these safeguards’ exalted place in administrative and 
constitutional law, courts have spent little time considering how to 
remedy structural violations for regulated parties who assert 
successful challenges. This lack of consideration may arise from the 
unclear nature of regulated parties’ relationship with the structural 
safeguards. In those rare instances when the Court describes the 
regulated parties’ concern in the safeguard, it sometimes speaks of a 
safeguard as establishing “personal rights”75 but other times refers to 
personal “interests.”76 The Court has suggested (if not held) that 
regulated parties have “implied private right[s] of action directly 
 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n.4 (1984)) (“We nonetheless affirm the admissibility of the 
pager because it would inevitably have been lawfully discovered and, in any event, the 
district court's denial of the motion to suppress the pager was harmless error.”).  
 73. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155–56 (rejecting the dissent’s functional 
analysis); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184 n.4, 186 (1995); see also Landry v. 
FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a showing of harm was not 
required for a structural violation to exist); Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (“The [Appointments] [C]lause would be a nullity if it could be assumed that 
these very officials would in fact have been properly appointed and (especially) confirmed 
by the Senate.”).  
 74. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 888; infra Part II.A.1.  
 75. See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1996). 
 76. See id. 
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under the Constitution . . . under the Appointments Clause or 
separation-of-powers principles,” including the principles under 
Article II, that entitle them to unspecified equitable relief.77 In the 
context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,78 the Court has recognized a key 
difference between “rights” and “interests” (or “benefits”) that 
influences the availability of remedies in important ways.79 But the 
Court has not explored whether there is a difference between “rights” 
and “interests” in the separation-of-powers context and whether that 
difference might have remedial consequences. 
This Article does not seek to resolve the relationship between 
regulated parties and structural safeguards. It refers to the regulated 
parties’ concerns for structural safeguards or norms as “rights” and 
“interests” interchangeably without intending for the terms to take on 
some additional significance. The important point here is that the 
Court has not paused to consider how constitutional rules that 
address the relations of the branches of government intersect with 
private parties who invoke these rules and with the remedies those 
private parties seek. Yet considering the meaningfulness and 
adaptability of structural remedies from the regulated party’s 
perspective may inform the descriptive and normative nature of the 
party’s interest in and relationship to the safeguards. 
II.  PROPER REMEDIES 
Remedial considerations are important for two key reasons. The 
first reason is obvious but often overlooked: remedies are what 
litigants get in a concrete sense if their lawsuits are successful. Many 
litigants may care only marginally, if at all, about the boundaries of 
administrative structures or these structures’ effect on constitutional 
or administrative law theory. But they do care about altering agency 
structures in ways that further their own interests. The second reason 
is that substantive norms and remedies are so closely bound together 
that it is all but meaningless to consider one without the other.80 
A. The Importance of Remedies 
Scholars may view remedies as “the banausic sphere of policy, 
pragmatism, and politics.”81 But litigants generally care only about 
 
 77. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151 n.2 (quoting the United States’ brief). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 79. See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). 
 80. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 857. 
 81. Id. 
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substantive norms that have practical value to them. Without an 
adequate remedy, a norm loses its value and is not worth 
vindicating.82 For instance, the mere pronouncement of a norm 
through a declaratory judgment may be less valuable than a 
prohibitory injunction that limits administrative action, leaving 
litigants less incentive to vindicate that norm. If affected parties have 
no incentive to enforce a norm, that norm may cease to operate. 
Remedies also give shape and meaning to substantive law. The 
U.S. Constitution is nearly silent as to how courts or Congress should 
remedy constitutional violations.83 This silence can be beneficial, 
giving judges room to maneuver as they consider ideals that animate 
constitutional rights and interests in a practical, political space. Yet it 
also requires courts (and perhaps Congress) to accept the 
responsibility of considering what makes a remedy proper. Remedies 
become “the means by which the abstractions of the substantive law 
are translated into concrete terms.”84 
1.  Rights and Remedies’ Interdependence 
In examining certain constitutional civil rights, Professor Daryl 
Levinson concluded that this translation does more than make 
hortatory rhetoric comprehensible.85 Remedies, in his view, also 
modify the meaning of norms or rights by narrowing or expanding 
them.86 For instance, the Court’s early equal-protection decisions 
after Brown v. Board of Education87 could be read as applying to de 
jure and de facto discrimination. But the Court used remedies, such 
as with school-busing schemes’ temporal length and geographic reach, 
to limit an equal-protection right to de jure discrimination.88 
Remedies may even come to define the right itself. For example, 
faced with the vague Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and 
unusual” punishment as applied to prison conditions, courts and 
litigants have used past judicial remedies—such as limits on the 
number of inmates housed in a room as established in a consent 
decree—as constitutional benchmarks that apply to similar litigation, 
 
 82. See id. at 887 (referring to the “cash value of a right” as dependent on the 
remedy). 
 83. See Hill, supra note 34, at 1118. One notable exception is the reference to habeas 
corpus. See id. at 1118 n.42. 
 84. Wright, supra note 33, at 377; see also Levinson, supra note 32, at 858 (discussing 
the relationship of rights and remedies). 
 85. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 873–74. 
 86. See id. 
 87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 88. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 884–85. 
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whereby it is “cruel and unusual” to exceed those numbers in the 
future.89 This inversion of remedy and rights occurs because “the only 
way to get a sense of which prison conditions are [cruel and unusual] 
is to see what kinds of concrete changes are required by remedial 
orders.”90 Because remedies can, in various ways, define substantive 
norms, they are, to use Levinson’s term, in “equilibrium,” such that 
neither is more important than the other.91 
Of particular importance to the subject at hand is a critical point 
about the right-remedy relationship: as remedies narrow in scope or 
decrease in number, rights lose value to litigants who seek to enforce 
them.92 Yet limiting remedies can have virtues. The Court, for 
example, has understandably taken account of federalism, judicial 
competence, and political resistance when fashioning constitutional 
remedies.93 Using remedies to limit a right’s practical effect allows 
courts to consider competing values and costs in achieving as much of 
a remedy as is possible for a particular norm.94 In the administrative 
context, for instance, courts can balance the need for litigating parties 
to have incentives to seek redress against either the chaos that could 
arise from entirely stopping an agency from functioning or concerns 
about judicial competence in redesigning arms of the federal 
government.95 The balancing of such competing considerations may 
also permit courts to expand remedies later as practical realities 
change.96 
Expanding remedies also alters rights, but not necessarily in ways 
that litigants would prefer. Although an expansive remedy may seek 
to ensure that an underlying norm is fully vindicated, such a remedy 
can lead to underenforcement of substantive norms.97 A remedy that 
is too powerful may face legitimate or illegitimate resistance or 
demand such an investment of judicial resources that courts avoid 
finding a violation in the first place.98 For instance, courts could 
invalidate entire agencies—such as the SEC—based on structural 
 
 89. See id. at 879–80. 
 90. Id. at 880. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 888; see also Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 837 
(2004) (“Nonetheless, the danger [that an expanded right may ultimately become less 
available] may be inherent in every attempt to expand a right, for at some point, as the 
definition of a right is enlarged, there are likely to be reasons for qualifying access.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 589–628; Levinson, supra note 32, at 873–84. 
 94. See Wright, supra note 33, at 377–81. 
 95. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 598–608. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 866–70. 
 98. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 589–91. 
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deficiencies. But aware of the practical chaos that such a remedy 
would create, courts would likely narrow the underlying structural 
safeguard so as to rarely find a violation.99 
2.  Rights and Remedies’ Independence 
Despite the importance of the relationship between rights and 
remedies, Levinson’s remedial-equilibrium paradigm may be less 
salient in the context of structural challenges to the federal 
administrative state. Oftentimes these structural challenges are based 
on more formally defined rights than those imposed by the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to which Levinson refers. For 
instance, the Appointments Clause requires that principal officers be 
appointed in one way and that inferior officers be appointed in one of 
four ways.100 Although there is uncertainty over, say, the nature of a 
department or an officer, the nature of the constitutional requirement 
is relatively clear because the Constitution provides exactly how the 
appointment must occur.101 Likewise, the Court has come to express 
the nature of the President’s supervisory powers in formal terms 
based on the kind of protections that an executive-branch officer has 
from the President’s (or other officer’s) at-will removal.102 The 
boundaries of required executive supervision often fluctuate within 
the Court’s jurisprudence, but the constitutional requirement can be 
stated in relatively clear terms of protection from at-will removal. 
Unlike the scenarios that Levinson considers, the presence of a 
structural violation, as opposed to its importance, can be established 
without regard to the remedy: whether that remedy is the invalidation 
of the agency itself, invalidation of a specific agency action, or 
invalidation of the offending statutory provision. 
Thinking of rights and remedies as independent concepts103 can 
also be practical and allow legislatures room to address remedial 
 
 99. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 889, 913; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing how 
courts have limited the Article III safeguard as it applies to agencies). 
 100. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 102. See generally Barnett, Independent Agency, supra note 38, at 1367–69 (discussing 
the Court’s formalist analysis of the President’s removal power and the importance of the 
language in protections from removal). 
 103. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 736 (1917) (“Whether he can make the seizure 
himself . . . may be important as to remedy, but does not affect his ultimate and essential 
right.”). 
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concerns.104 Certain scholars have sought to separate a right from its 
remedy to ensure that courts have full power to define rights à la 
Marbury v. Madison105 while recognizing Congress’s power to help 
define suitable remedies.106 They recognize that creating remedies 
requires balancing different interests, including fiscal and 
administrative costs that have a significance that is independent from 
the norm itself.107 Fact-bound remedial considerations such as these 
may be more suitable for legislatures than courts.108 
This insight is important because it recognizes that Congress can 
and should play a role in fashioning remedies. As Professor (and 
former Acting U.S. Solicitor General) Walter Dellinger has argued in 
the context of Fourth Amendment violations, the means of enforcing 
“constitutional right[s] should be left with Congress unless, in the 
absence of judicial action, the right in question would be so wanting 
of remedies as to render it a mere form of words.”109 Rights can be 
realized in different ways, each with its own set of costs, effectiveness, 
and symbolic consequences. As explained below,110 viewing Congress 
as a partner in structural remediation (and consequently defining the 
safeguard) may provide useful play in the joints as structural remedies 
are fitted to structural constitutional violations. 
B. Key Remedial Values 
Although “a perfect remedy is a frequent illusion,”111 a remedy 
can qualify as “good” only if it responds to relevant underlying 
values.112 In the context of structural remediation, however, courts 
and scholars have often failed to consider values that the remedy 
 
 104. See Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 757 (2012) 
(noting that Levinson’s theory can be useful but “overwhelm[ing]” and limiting its 
application for purposes of his thesis). 
 105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 106. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 678. 
 107. See Dellinger, supra note 34, at 1556. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 1536 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 111. Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 591–92. 
 112. Cf. Wright, supra note 33, at 386 (recognizing that courts should look past the 
technical rules of legal and equitable remedies and instead consider the “relevant social 
policies”). Professor Wright identified five remedial principles or purposes that remedies 
are intended to serve. See id. at 377–80. But these purposes or principles, in some 
instances, are instead merely descriptions of the nature of the remedy. For instance, he 
identifies a schedule of remedies as a purpose. Id. But a schedule of remedies—in which a 
statute provides the proper consideration for the violation of different rights or harms—is 
a kind of remedial scheme that may have many purposes, such as punishment, deterrence, 
and compensation. Id. 
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should attempt to satisfy.113 Those values are mentioned, if at all, only 
in passing.114 Or the court articulates “a rather variable application of 
the vague equitable maxim that ‘the nature of the . . . remedy is to be 
determined by the nature and scope of the violation’ ”115 or it states 
that “rights should find vindication in an effective remedy.”116 
To consider the success and failings of remedies for separation-
of-powers violations, I consider the three remedial values I have 
encountered most in scholarship and case law concerning remedies 
for individual parties: (1) compensation for past harm (and a related 
sub-value of prospective enforcement of the norm), (2) incentives to 
seek redress of a violated norm, and (3) deterrence of future 
violations.117 I turn to private-law remedial practice (and certain 
public-law remedies) to put structural remedies in context and to 
suggest how structural remedies for prevailing regulated parties can 
be viewed as succeeding or failing. I do not contend here that 
remedies should work exactly the same way in all private- and public-
law contexts or that no other considerations—such as regulatory 
chaos or separation-of-powers concerns—are relevant. Indeed, I 
recognize that these three most significant, traditional remedial 
values for private parties often rest awkwardly with structural 
remedies, suggesting that satisfactory remedies might be difficult to 
fashion and thus that courts should perhaps reconsider the nature of 
the underlying safeguards.118 
1.  Compensation for Past Harm and Prospective Enforcement 
Perhaps the most important remedial values are compensation 
for past harm and prospective enforcement. I discuss these values 
 
 113. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 591; Wright, supra note 33, at 376–81. 
 114. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 591. 
 115. Nagel, supra note 34, at 712. 
 116. Sturm, supra note 31, at 1378. 
 117. Other remedial values include personal vindication of the right, punishment, or 
restitution (focusing on the return of wrongful profits, not compensation for loss). See 
DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135–37 (1st ed. 1973). As I 
suggest later, punishment is not likely a relevant value in most structural contexts. See 
infra note 203. Likewise, personal vindication, in my view, is tied to litigation incentive and 
compensation. The mere pronouncement of a right may have some value (especially for 
certain dignitary harms), but it is almost certainly less valuable (and vindicated less fully) 
than an infringed right for which the law gives a more meaningful remedy. See DOBBS, 
supra, at 135 (referring to the use of nominal damages to vindicate “technical right[s]”). 
Vindication, therefore, has little value in and of itself and rarely occurs without the other 
values’ presence. I have also not considered restitution here because of the difficulty of 
valuing how the government or a particular branch of government has “profited” from a 
structural defect. My focus is on the prevailing party’s injury. 
 118. See infra Part IV.C. 
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together in this Section because of their close relationship to one 
another in the structural context. Prospective enforcement through 
injunctive relief is, of course, common in public-law litigation and 
provides the prevailing party, in most cases, with either some 
substantive benefit or procedures that are more likely than structural 
reforms to influence an agency’s substantive decision.119 Money 
damages, however, are conspicuously absent in most constitutional 
challenges against the federal government, thereby limiting 
compensation to a prevailing party for past harm.120 Courts, 
nonetheless, can partially achieve both of these values in the 
structural context without money damages by attempting to 
compensate through equitable relief.121 
Compensation for an inflicted injury is likely the most familiar 
purpose of legal remedies.122 Compensation can take different forms 
but generally manifests itself through money damages.123 In tort law, 
money damages are typically tied to harm to property, medical bills, 
pain and suffering, lost wages or profits, and the like.124 
Compensatory money damages for breach of contract usually look to 
expectation damages, which are based on what the non-breaching 
party expected to receive from a performed contract.125 The 
underlying notion is that monetary damages in both contexts will 
make the victim whole, meaning that the law—to the extent 
possible—places the victim in the place where he or she would have 
 
 119. See infra Part II.B.2. For example, many procedural challenges will concern 
parties’ rights under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
These procedural challenges could be based upon the failure of the agency to engage in 
required notice-and-comment rulemaking, see id. § 553(b)(3), the failure of the agency to 
provide sufficient notice for a proposed rule, see id. § 553(b), the failure of the agency to 
provide a sufficient explanation of a final rule’s basis and purpose, see id. § 553(c), or the 
failure of the agency to abide by the procedural requirements for formal adjudication, see 
id. §§ 554, 556. The agency’s failure to abide by these procedural requirements can 
indicate a failure to obtain or consider relevant comments or testimony. The agency’s 
failure to do so can lead to a different outcome. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 
F.2d 1098, 1106–07 (4th Cir. 1985) (invalidating an agency rule that sought to prohibit 
beneficiaries of the Women, Infants and Children Program (“WIC”) from purchasing 
chocolate milk because of inadequate notice to interested parties); see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Benefits and Services: WIC Food Package, FOOD & NUTRITION SERVICE, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/benefitsandservices/former-foodpkgmilkfaqs.HTM (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2013) (noting that chocolate milk continues to be WIC-eligible).  
 120. See infra text accompanying notes 128–46. 
 121. See Wright, supra note 33, at 377–78. 
 122. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 592; Wright, supra note 33, at 377. 
 123. See Wright, supra note 33, at 377. 
 124. See DOBBS, supra note 117, at 540–51. 
 125. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 730–33 (4th ed. 2004). 
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been had no violation or breach occurred.126 Constitutional litigation, 
too, often focuses on compensatory values in the context of § 1983 
litigation and actions brought directly under the Constitution itself.127 
No matter how uncomfortably the compensation value rests 
within constitutional challenges generally, it may rest even less 
comfortably within structural litigation for two main reasons. First, a 
prevailing party’s loss caused by a structural defect may be difficult to 
value, which renders compensation difficult to achieve.128 Assume, for 
instance, that a regulated party against which an agency has 
successfully asserted an enforcement proceeding demonstrates that 
the agency is not sufficiently subject to the President’s supervision. 
The pecuniary damage to the regulated party is difficult to measure 
because it seeks to quantify the harm caused by having an agency that 
was not sufficiently accountable to the President. Perhaps one should 
envision a world in which a properly supplicant agency would or 
would not have brought an enforcement proceeding or taken some 
other action because of either differing discretion or changes to the 
substantive regulatory policy. But numerous scholars have questioned 
the practical significance of the President’s power to remove 
officers,129 rendering it speculative to suggest that a properly 
supervised agency would have acted any differently. If so, the injury 
to the regulated party is difficult to discern and, like emotional 
harms,130 difficult to measure in monetary terms. This is not to say 
that all other public-law or even private-law harms are easy to value. 
But structural challenges will almost always present valuation and 
 
 126. See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2005); DOBBS, supra note 117, at 136 (“[T]he main purpose 
of the damages award is some rough kind of compensation for the plaintiff’s loss.”); 
Wright, supra note 33, at 377 (describing the “indemnity” or compensation principle). 
 127. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, The Right–Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 
YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690 
(1978) (permitting compensatory awards for a municipality’s violation of constitutional 
rights that are based on the municipality’s policy or custom and overruling contrary 
holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). 
 128. See Bray, supra note 104, at 763 (citing Ronen Avaraham, Putting a Price on Pain-
and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal 
for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 94–96 & n.43 (2006)). 
 129. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 56, at 30; Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets 
Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 461, 480–81 (2010); Jonathan L. Entin, 
Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1595, 1601–02 (1997); Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: 
Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 777–81 (1987); Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2273–74 (2001). 
 130. See Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass’n, 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(“Injuries [for mental and emotional distress] are by their nature difficult to prove.”). 
CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 481 
504 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92 
 
causation difficulties even if, as in the case of emotional harms, those 
difficulties can sometimes be overcome. 
Second, even if one presumes that the agency would not have 
taken a certain action in the absence of a structural defect, the case 
for pecuniary damages may be weaker than in other contexts because 
the judiciary, as in many other public-law contexts, can prevent much 
of the harm by providing prospective enforcement with an injunction. 
Agencies will typically require regulated parties to take particular 
actions, such as paying a fine or discontinuing a business practice. The 
court can avoid much of any resulting harm by staying or invalidating 
the agency’s order or other action.131 By preventing the injury from 
occurring and enforcing the norm prospectively, the Court may 
render compensation for past harm less important.132 
For any harm that remains uncompensated, a monetary remedy 
does not likely exist, whether the structural violations are deemed 
analogous to tort or contract. Although Congress has ensured under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) that a litigant can seek 
“relief other than money damages” against an agency and its 
 
 131. Indeed, invalidating an agency order or rule is the most typical remedy for an 
overreaching agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). This is true whether the defect is 
procedural, see David B. Chaffin, Note, Remedies for Noncompliance with Section 553 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act: A Critical Evaluation of United States Steel and 
Western Oil & Gas, 1982 DUKE L.J. 461, 464–65 (“Most courts sustaining such procedural 
challenges immediately invalidate the rule and remand the case to the agency with 
instructions to follow proper section 553 procedures.”); id. at 465 n.23 (“Most courts use 
this remedy [of invalidation and remand] as a matter of course, seemingly without 
considering whether alternatives are available.”), or substantive, see Glen Staszewski, 
Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct 
Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (2003) (“When an agency fails to engage in 
reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process, courts must invalidate the final 
rule and remand the matter to the agency for further consideration.”).  
 132. To be sure, the regulated party likely incurred significant legal fees in regulatory 
investigations and proceedings. See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 
811–12 (1994). Yet, despite some exceptions in administrative matters, courts typically 
ignore these costs as merely part of doing business or of living in a society with a 
functioning judiciary (and administrative state). See id. at 809; Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for 
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 233–34 (1995) (citing 
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988)) (noting that the Equal Access to Justice Act permits recovery 
of attorneys’ fees if the government’s position is not substantially justified); Gregory C. 
Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for 
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REV. 1, 191–200 (1995) (citing 
Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified Success, 
11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 500 (1993)) (noting the rarity of EAJA awards and limited 
effectiveness of the statute at realizing remedial purposes); John P. Stern, Note, Applying 
the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE L.J. 1459, 1464 (1989) 
(noting that awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA are rare). 
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officials,133 Congress has generally retained its sovereign immunity 
from suits seeking monetary damages.134 The two significant statutes 
in which Congress has waived its sovereign immunity—the Federal 
Tort Claims Act135 for tort claims and the Tucker Act136 for contract 
claims—are almost certainly inapplicable to nearly all regulated 
parties that assert structural challenges.137 
Likewise, the courts have not created a cause of action for money 
damages against agency officials directly under the Constitution for 
structural violations. The Court has created direct causes of action 
under the Constitution in limited circumstances. In Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,138 the Court 
created a direct cause of action against federal officials who violate 
the Fourth Amendment.139 Although Bivens focused on the Fourth 
Amendment, a “Bivens action” has come to refer to all actions for 
money damages brought directly under the Constitution.140 The Court 
has created Bivens actions under the Fifth Amendment141 and the 
Eighth Amendment.142 But the Court has since responded cautiously 
“to suggestions that Bivens be extended into new contexts.”143 In 
particular, the Court unanimously refused to create a Bivens action 
against federal agencies themselves.144 
 
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 134. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 614–16 (4th ed. 2003). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
 136. Id. at § 1346. 
 137. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(en banc) (citing United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing 
the Tucker Act)), overruled by United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 
(2011), as stated in U.S. Home Corp. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 191, 194 (Fed. Cl. 
2012); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 621 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 
15, 27 (1953) (discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act)). 
 138. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 139. Id. at 389. 
 140. See Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Note, Grosh v. Ramirez, the Warranty Requirement, 
and Qualified Immunity, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1179, 1182 n.30 (2004). 
 141. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979). 
 142. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980). The Court has assumed, but never 
held, that a Bivens action may be grounded in the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)). 
 143. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 422 (1988). 
 144. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). In Meyer, a federal agency 
terminated Meyer from his position as an officer of a failing thrift institution. Id. at 473. 
Meyer asserted several claims, including a putative Bivens claim against the federal agency 
(and a federal officer) for due process violations. See id. at 474, 484. The Supreme Court 
held that Bivens actions are not cognizable against the federal agencies because: Bivens 
itself was an action against federal officers, see id. at 484–85; the extension of Bivens 
actions against an agency would allow parties to make an end-run around qualified 
immunity doctrines that protect federal officers, see id. at 485; and the threat of Bivens 
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A Bivens action, moreover, may make little sense in a structural-
challenge context. The Court has stated that it will not extend Bivens 
when Congress has created an alternate, equally effective resolution 
mechanism or when other “special factors counsel[] hesitation.”145 
“Special factors” (despite being ill-defined in case law) likely exist 
structural-challenge context. First, structural defects, by their very 
nature, usually infect the entire agency and thereby affect numerous 
agency actions and actors as opposed to a specific action, policy, or 
actor. Second, because a structural defect is usually not created by the 
agency itself or its actors, the agency officials should not be personally 
responsible (even if later indemnified by the federal government) for 
compensating the wronged party. Unlike other Bivens claims based 
on individual rights within the Bill of Rights, structural defects do not 
involve legal principles that often come into conflict with day-to-day 
agency actions, and thus the agency official would have little reason 
to be familiar with the nature of structural limitations. This is so 
because it is Congress (usually with the support of the President) that 
creates the agencies and any resulting structural defect. Given a 
Bivens action’s close relationship to tort, the extension of Bivens to 
structural challenges would ignore the identity of the analogous 
tortfeasor and the causation between the putative tortfeasor’s action 
and the inflicted harm.146 
Despite the absence of a cause of action for money damages, 
courts can still validate the compensatory interest in other, albeit 
perhaps less complete and conventional, ways. Equitable relief, such 
as specific performance, can provide not only prospective 
enforcement but also compensation even in the tort context.147 For 
 
actions unadorned by qualified immunity would lead to “a potentially enormous financial 
burden for the Federal Government.” Id. at 486.  
 145. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971). The 
Court has provided little guidance as to the “special factors,” but it has denied Bivens 
actions when Congress has established alternative remedial mechanisms or the claims 
arise from military service. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 600–04. Likewise, in 
Meyer, the Court deemed the potentially “enormous financial burden for the Federal 
Government” that could arise from allowing Bivens actions directly against federal 
agencies as a “special factor[] counselling hesitation.” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486 (internal 
citation omitted).  
 146. Cf. Hill, supra note 34, at 1137. If a Bivens action did lie, the official would not 
likely be able to rely on immunity defenses. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 
(1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 523 (1978). Qualified immunity, typically 
available to administrative officials, is available only to discretionary decisions. See 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Whether an agency is established properly does not involve a 
discretionary decision on the part of an agency official. See id. 
 147. See Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 908 (1990); 
Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979). 
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instance, in a car-accident case in which the plaintiff suffered only 
property damage, a court could require the defendant to have the 
plaintiff’s car repaired instead of requiring the defendant to pay 
money damages.148 Having the car repaired can make the plaintiff 
substantially whole in the same way as money can. Specific 
performance may also be very useful in an imperfect world by 
providing a compensatory remedy when valuation is difficult.149 
Certain forms of equitable relief that are analogous to specific 
performance can serve a similar purpose in structural-defect cases. 
The most common remedy for unconstitutional action is injunctive 
relief to provide prospective enforcement of an underlying norm.150 
As part of the equitable relief, a court faced with a structural defect 
could—and sometimes does151—go further by requiring a wholly new 
proceeding, investigation, or other action before or by a properly 
established agency.152 A new proceeding before a properly configured 
agency compensates in part. As with a specific-performance remedy 
for breach of contract, the regulated party obtains all to which it was 
entitled under the “contract” between citizen and government that is 
the U.S. Constitution. Likewise, as with analogous tort remedies (for 
example, the return of an item that has been converted by the 
defendant), the regulated party is returned to substantially the same 
position that the party would have been in had the government not 
“wronged” the regulated party by establishing a structurally defective 
agency.153 The new proceeding ensures that the party receives the 
 
 148. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 117, at 135; Wright, supra note 33, at 378. 
 149. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 125, at 747–48. 
 150. See Preis, supra note 35, at 1–3. 
 151. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3161–62 (2010); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 
1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013) (No. 12-928). 
 152. Perhaps sovereign immunity prohibits courts from awarding some form of specific 
performance or other injunctive relief, such as when the relief sought is equivalent to 
monetary damages. See Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 554 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2009). But courts have awarded analogous relief 
when Congress has violated the Appointments Clause, see infra Part III, and, despite the 
general applicability of sovereign immunity, the Courts have a long history of awarding 
various forms of injunctive relief that may address the effects of past violations, see, e.g., 
Preis, supra note 35, at 43–44, 48–50. 
 153. Although it is true that the prevailing party does not recover any compensation 
for attorneys’ fees and other expenses that it incurred because of the actions taken by a 
structurally defective agency, these expenses are, as discussed above, those that the law 
generally does not deem compensable. See supra note 132. In the structural context, as in 
other constitutional challenges against the federal government, the equitable remedies can 
compensate only in part. 
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structural safeguard’s protection for all portions of an agency’s 
decision-making process. 
If, in contrast, the court does not require new proceedings, but 
instead only “cure[s]” future proceedings through the issuance of 
exclusively forward-looking injunctive relief,154 the remedy may 
prevent some future harm by enforcing the norm prospectively. But 
the remedy does not give the prevailing party that to which it was 
entitled in the first instance. It also does not stop any “tainted fruit” 
of the initial, defective proceedings from infecting future proceedings. 
Instead, future harms based on past structural defects may 
significantly affect regulated parties so long as the court gives the 
agency’s past actions de facto validity. For example, a judicial remedy 
that provides de facto validity to the past actions of unconstitutionally 
installed officers but otherwise forbids the agency from promulgating 
future regulations or holding future adjudications—an actual remedy 
that the Court has employed155—would not compensate for past 
violations or even prevent those future harms that flow from a 
structurally defective administrative entity’s past actions. 
To be sure, courts often ignore or fail to fulfill the compensatory 
value when the United States has acted in an unconstitutional manner 
even outside the structural context. Based on prudential concerns, for 
example, courts provide only prospective injunctive relief to stop an 
ongoing constitutional or statutory violation, preventing future harm 
but not rectifying past wrongs.156 But, as is relevant to the other two 
values discussed below, the prevailing party obtains something 
substantive and meaningful in most non-structural cases (whether 
based on constitutional or administrative law). For example, the 
agency may be required to ignore a particular criterion, treat certain 
regulated parties similarly, or engage in certain procedures. These 
requirements can, but do not always, affect the agency’s final decision 
and thereby are meaningful to the prevailing party. And even if 
compensation is uncommon in non-structural challenges, the failure 
to provide past compensatory relief is a recurring criticism of 
constitutional-remedial doctrine,157 a criticism that courts—through 
 
 154. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184–86 (1995). 
 155. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the structural remedy in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 156. See Preis, supra note 35, at 1–3. 
 157. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1427 (1987) (“Whenever [governments] do act unconstitutionally, they must in some way 
undo the violation by ensuring that victims are made whole. In many cases, only 
governmental liability can provide this assurance.”); see also Jeffries, supra note 127, at 
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Bivens actions, school-busing cases seeking to eradicate “effects” of 
segregation, and affirmative-action cases—have oftentimes responded 
to in a robust way.158 In short, remedies for other constitutional 
violations do not establish that the compensatory value is irrelevant 
or unnecessary, only that it is often not fully realized. 
2.  Incentives to Pursue Redress 
Meaningful remedies should provide wronged parties with 
incentives to enforce their interests159 because otherwise the 
underlying norm has no traction in the real world.160 In one of its 
more recent structural-defect decisions, the Supreme Court 
recognized that a remedy must provide sufficient incentive to litigate 
structural challenges.161 Without such an incentive, the wronged party 
will be unlikely to seek to vindicate the interest that the Court seeks 
to safeguard. 
This is so even if the remedy is fully compensatory for an 
individual litigant. If the right or norm’s value is lower than the cost 
of asserting the claim or if the remedy does little to advance the 
litigant’s related interests, the rational litigant will not bother to assert 
that interest.162 For instance, much of the debate over the lawfulness 
of class-action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements centers on 
the problem of ensuring that consumers have incentive to assert a 
fully compensated right.163 An arbitration agreement may well 
provide full compensation for a breach-of-contract or tort claim in 
 
87–88 (discussing the contributions of Amar and other scholars to the discussion of 
remedies). 
 158. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (Powell, J.) 
(directing admission of a Caucasian student to medical school); Christopher J. Peters, 
Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1515 n.254 (2000) 
(referring to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1971)). 
 159. See Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA 
L. REV. 1535, 1589 (2004). 
 160. See Angela C. Zambrano, Robert Velevis & Kent Barnett, Wavering Over 
Consumer Class Actions, 12 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Dec. 2008, at 4, 6 
(considering consumers’ incentive to litigate low-value claims); cf. Ann C. McGinley & 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard Posner’s Pragmatism & 
Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV. 193, 254 n.443 (1994) (noting, in corrective 
justice terms, incentive problems in rendering low-value discrimination claims difficult to 
assert). 
 161. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183, 186 (1995). 
 162. See supra note 160. 
 163. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) 
(citing cases), abrogated on preemption grounds by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011), as recognized in Coneff v. AT&T, 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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arbitration proceedings.164 However, if full compensation is relatively 
small and less than the financial and opportunity costs of asserting the 
legal claim, the wronged party will likely not bother to assert the 
right. As Judge Posner has colorfully stated, “only a lunatic or a 
fanatic sues over $30.”165 
The lack of incentive may be less obvious in the case of regulated 
corporate parties. Regulated parties, for example, often have 
incentives to litigate because they have better access to the judicial 
system than consumers, and, given their typically long-term 
relationship and repeat-player status with agencies, they stand to 
suffer or gain more from any particular judicial or administrative 
decision.166 But limited remedies and frequent interaction with 
agencies sometimes encourage timidity in challenging administrative 
structure. Public-choice theory as applied in the regulatory context, 
after all, suggests that regulated repeat players will not want to risk 
offending the same officials whose cooperation and favor they may 
need in the future.167 To be sure, many officials’ professionalism or 
unawareness of the proceedings may prevent them from becoming 
hostile, and any particular official’s response is usually a matter of 
speculation. But the uncertain reaction of any particular agency 
official will itself be a variable in the litigation calculus of regulated 
parties who interact frequently with a particular administrative 
agency. In fact, a regulated party who challenged the CFPB on 
separation-of-powers grounds expressed its fears that parties who 
challenge the CFPB’s constitutionality face the threat of the CFPB 
bringing a retaliatory enforcement action.168 Moreover, other scholars 
 
 164. See id. at 1007. 
 165. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 166. See John D. Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural “Reform”: In 
Defense of Environmental Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 608 (2003). 
 167. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
636 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682–83 (1975). The meaning of “public choice theory” is 
notoriously “supple.” Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice 
and the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 115 n.16 (2000). I use the 
term here merely to refer to an economic understanding of agency motivation, which often 
considers relationships among various actors, including the agencies themselves, in 
administrative and legislative decision-making. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2008). 
 168. See Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, 2013 WL 5664696, at *7 
(D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2013). The CFPB had been investigating Morgan Drexen and advised that 
it was considering an enforcement action. Morgan Drexen then filed its constitutional 
challenge, and the CFPB in turn filed its enforcement action in another jurisdiction. See id. 
at *2–3. The court found Morgan Drexen’s fears “exaggerate[ed],” and it presumed that 
the CFPB’s “enforcement actions are brought in good faith.” Id. at *7. 
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have noted a similar phenomenon in the context of judicial 
disqualification motions, where parties are hesitant to question an 
adjudicator’s impartiality, even where a strong case for establishing a 
conflict of interest exists.169 
Moreover, a regulated party’s incentive to assert a structural 
challenge may be meaningfully different from a regulated party’s 
incentive to assert a substantive, policy-based challenge under the 
APA. If, for example, a successful structural challenge results only in 
formal changes to the agency’s design, the potential reward for a 
successful challenge is hard to define ex ante and perhaps not 
meaningful to the regulated party’s substantive goals. This same 
successful challenge to the officials’ very legitimacy may also lead to a 
risk of offending these officials and causing them, consciously or not, 
to be uncooperative in future regulatory matters with the litigant. The 
regulated party may find the risk-and-reward calculus more favorable 
with a traditional challenge to agency action under the APA. A 
successful challenge under the APA is more likely than a structural 
challenge to provide remedies that alter a substantive administrative 
action without offending agency officials. For APA challenges, the 
agency’s and officials’ legitimacy does not come into question—only 
the specific action does. For example, the candidates in Buckley could 
have challenged the FEC’s specific election-finance rulings (assuming 
that they were otherwise suitable for judicial review), had orders or 
rules set aside under the APA as “arbitrary or capricious,” and 
returned to any ongoing or future agency proceedings with a clearer 
understanding of the governing substantive law.170 These kinds of 
substantive challenges to agency action are routine under the APA 
and do not involve challenges to an agency’s very legitimacy. The 
regulated party, therefore, has more incentive to bring the APA 
challenge. 
Of course, substantive or procedural challenges to agency action 
will not always lead to a new result,171 but the odds are better than 
with a structural challenge. The agency may, upon remand, come to 
the same conclusion, although this time after a permissible process or 
 
 169. See, e.g., Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and 
the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 614 (2004); Tobin A. 
Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct’s Prohibition on Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 441, 479–80 (2006). 
 170. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 171. See Nate Hausman, Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh of 
Equitable Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 188 (2011). 
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upon a reasoned basis.172 But the judiciary’s rejection of agency 
reasoning or procedures makes it more likely that an agency may 
adjust its policy, given that regulated parties likely obtain more 
control in the next round of administrative proceedings by obtaining 
more procedures (which provides time to organize any regulatory 
allies) or taking off the table certain arguments that the agency relied 
upon in past proceedings. A structural challenge, in contrast, may 
lead to new proceedings, but the agency—even if not offended by the 
structural challenge—does not need to use different reasoning or 
procedures to reach the prior result or continue its course of action.173 
To be sure, political pressures may, at least theoretically, increase or 
decrease after the structural alteration to the agency, affecting the 
administrative action.174 Yet their existence or effect is difficult to 
determine in advance, and it may be that the regulated party cannot 
control them. 
3.  Deterrence 
Remedies that compensate and incentivize the wronged party 
usually also deter violation of private- and public-law rights.175 
Indeed, deterrence from such a remedy may be at its zenith when the 
damages are less certain and potentially very substantial.176 But 
 
 172. See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 200–06 (1947). 
 173. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 188 (1995). 
 174. The political pressures could properly increase or decrease, depending on the 
nature of the structural change. Because the Appointments Clause is intended to hold an 
appointing official politically accountable usually to the President and perhaps the Senate, 
see Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)), requiring 
new administrative action through a properly appointed official may increase the political 
nature of a particular agency decision. Likewise, an agency official who loses protections 
from removal may, at least theoretically, be subject to additional political persuasion by 
the President or other executive-branch officials. See supra text accompanying notes 46–
55. But political pressures could properly decrease if a court decides that an Article III 
court—whose judges have numerous protections from political influence—must decide a 
certain matter instead of an administrative agency. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2609 (2011). Or, similarly, political pressure could decrease if a court determines that an 
agency has implied statutory protection from the President’s at-will removal. See Wiener 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1958). 
 175. See Dellinger, supra note 34, at 1553; Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 592; Wright, supra 
note 33, at 381. 
 176. See Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 49 
(2008); Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1405–06 (1987). But see Gregory Klass, Contracting for 
Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE L.J. 2, 22 (2007) (concluding, in the context of 
compensatory damages for breach of contractual terms meant to aid in any recovery, that 
“unliquidated compensatory damages for obstructive breach will, in many cases, do little 
or nothing to deter the promisor who would otherwise obstruct recovery”). 
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remedies that compensate and incentivize will not (and perhaps 
should not, in certain contexts) always deter. For example, providing 
expectation damages may compensate a non-breaching party to a 
contract, and the damages—if sufficiently large—may provide 
sufficient incentive for that party to seek redress. Yet those significant 
damages, especially if liquidated and thus certain, may not deter the 
breaching party when the breach is economically efficient.177 
Likewise, even tortfeasors may determine the efficiency of a breached 
duty, as Ford’s infamous cost-benefit memo in the “Pinto Case” 
attests.178 Thus for the law to deter, it may need to provide other 
familiar remedies, such as punitive,179 scheduled,180 or treble 
damages.181 Non-pecuniary remedies might also be developed, such as 
 
 177. Of course, for adherents of efficient breach, breach is not an undesirable event. 
Instead, it is merely one of two permissible choices, based on economic benefits: (1) 
perform under the contract or (2) breach and pay damages to the other party while 
entering into another, more profitable contract. See William J. Woodward, Jr., 
Contractarians, Community, and the Tort of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 
1103, 1138 (1996). If the breach is not undesirable, then deterrence has no place. See 
Wright, supra note 33, at 379. But structural safeguards in the Constitution do not present 
a choice between two economic alternatives; instead, they are prophylactic rules that seek 
to prevent the gradual usurpation of one branch’s power by another and to create the 
proper political incentives for governmental officers. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (discussing separation of powers); supra Part I. The Constitution, 
in other words, has already established the undesirable nature of certain administrative 
schemes, rendering deterrence a potentially germane value for an appropriate remedy. 
 178. See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against 
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16–17 & n.80 (1982). In the 
memo, Ford calculated that the cost of victim injuries and deaths from not using safer fuel 
tanks was less than the cost of modifying its cars to include safer fuel tanks. Id. As 
Professor Owen argues, the tortfeasor’s utilitarian considerations laid the basis for 
punitive damages, the purpose of which was to punish Ford and deter similar future 
conduct. Id. at 20–28. Compensatory damages—even if uncertain and significant—did not 
deter Ford’s action. Id. 
 179. This is not to say that these other remedies, including even punitive damages, 
necessarily accomplish the goal of deterrence. See DOBBS, supra note 117, at 220. 
 180. See Bray, supra note 104, at 756–57 (recognizing the deterrent effect of scheduled 
damages that are excessive). 
 181. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (“The 
very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful 
conduct . . . .”); John R. Harrison, Jr., Comment, The Deceptive Trade Practices—
Consumer Protection Act: The Shield Becomes the Sword, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 879, 915 
n.222 (1986). Treble damages can also serve as a means of providing incentive to litigants 
to seek redress. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that 
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—
Is This the End of RICO?”, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 912–13 n.166 (1990) (considering 
RICO); Christina L. Goshaw, Note, Tomilson v. Camel City Motors, Inc.: The North 
Carolina Supreme Court’s Hybrid Solution to Surety Liability Under General Statutes 
Section 75–16, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1959, 1977 (1992). 
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the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.182 
For structural-defect challenges, deterrence-based judicial 
remedies may be difficult to formulate. First, the sovereign-immunity 
doctrine limits the ability of courts to provide pecuniary remedies 
whether they are meant to compensate or deter.183 Indeed, Congress 
is even more unlikely to waive (and courts much less likely to find a 
waiver of) the government’s sovereign immunity from punitive 
damages.184 Second, deterrence-driven non-pecuniary remedies may 
be unnecessarily destructive to the administrative state, causing 
harms not only to the government but also to regulated parties. For 
instance, invalidating an entire agency or organic act based on 
concerns about the excessive independence of agency officials could 
be detrimental by halting pending, meritorious investigations and 
beneficial regulatory policymaking. Invalidation could also cause 
chaos for regulated entities which are not parties to the litigation by 
leaving the validity of previously promulgated regulations, 
interpretive rules, and agency precedent up in the air.185 Given these 
concerns, it is not surprising that the Court has endeavored to salvage 
the agency’s functions and granted Congress time to correct 
constitutional problems.186 Indeed, some have argued that, as a matter 
of separation-of-powers, the Court should seek to uphold 
congressional work product to the extent possible.187 Yet limiting 
administrative powers and confusion ensures that Congress (and 
usually the President) feels little pain when enacting legislation that 
 
 182. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Excessive 
Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638 
(1982). 
 183. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 184. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 627–
28 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in Crowley Marine Servs. v. FEDNAV LTD., 915 
F. Supp. 218, 222–23 (E.D. Wash. 1995). 
 185. Cf., e.g., Kaplinsky, supra note 30 (“Would any or all of the CFPB’s actions since 
Mr. Cordray was appointed be invalid? How do you unscramble the egg? What about 
future CFPB actions?”). 
 186. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137–43 (1976) (per curiam); see also Thomas E. 
Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 571 n.121 
(noting that the Supreme Court refused to give its holding in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), retroactive effect). 
Similar practical considerations routinely influence judicial remedies. See DOBBS, supra 
note 117, at 4–5. 
 187. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 777–78 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(advocating for invalidation of the “all but forgotten” removal provision instead of the 
“important federal enactments”); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (2d ed. 1986); Gorod, 
supra note 16, at 906, 918–19. 
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violates the Constitution’s structural safeguards.188 In other words, 
because the courts’ remedies exact a low “price” per violation, the 
remedies lose deterrent effect.189 
By considering a remedy’s deterrent effect on Congress and the 
President, a key difference between structural challenges and most 
other administrative litigation becomes apparent. In run-of-the-mill 
challenges to agency action, the action at issue, whether investigatory, 
adjudicatory, or rulemaking, is the action of the agency itself. But 
with structural challenges, the action at issue—the propriety of the 
administrative establishment—concerns the action of Congress and 
the President, who together enacted legislation that created the 
agency. Congress and the President, however, are not before the 
courts in the structural-challenge litigation, at least not in any 
practical sense.190 Although the United States may be a named party 
in such an action,191 the litigation will almost certainly be handled by 
agency or other executive-branch lawyers.192 The President and 
 
 188. Indeed, the executive branch, despite its role in enacting a structural defect in 
most instances, may benefit in three ways when the courts craft an ineffective, pragmatic 
remedy. First, the courts’ pragmatic concerns for administrative functioning can enable the 
executive branch to avoid administrative uncertainty and disruption that a structural 
defect might otherwise bring. Second, a structural defect often inures to the executive 
branch’s benefit because the President has a role in all but one method of appointing 
officers under the Appointments Clause (and a concomitant removal power) and because 
the President, at least in theory, gains power when an agency officer loses protection from 
removal. Third, the executive branch may obtain political capital in Congress’s and the 
public’s eyes by originally agreeing to legislation that “diminish[es] [future presidents’] 
powers,” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 131 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 
(2010), despite its later unconstitutionality. 
 189. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 889. 
 190. Remedies for unconstitutional legislation outside of the structural context may 
pose similar deterrence problems, but typical remedies for such violations (such as 
injunctions and invalidated orders) may prove to be more successful remedies overall. 
Although Congress and the President may enact unconstitutional, non-structural 
legislation, they almost certainly will not be parties to any future litigation. Instead, the 
agency officials will be the proper parties. Thus, deterrence may prove problematic. But 
the structural challenge is more perplexing because of the litigation-incentive issues 
discussed in Part II.B.2. A litigant who prevails in finding a substantive law 
unconstitutional obtains the invalidation or limitation of substantive or procedural agency 
action. 
 191. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2012). 
 192. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 937–47 (2012). 
Professor Frost notes how rarely Congress has its own counsel in litigation, except in 
certain instances in which the executive and legislative branches have significant, 
conflicting interests. Id. Those instances included cases concerning the so-called legislative 
veto in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), “the line-item veto, the independent counsel 
statute, and qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.” Id. at 945. Indeed, Congress has 
not appeared when the executive branch advocates a position that, at least in theory, 
reduces the President’s power and enhances Congress’s. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
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Congress are almost never parties and are also very unlikely to be 
involved even behind the scenes.193 Deterring violators who are 
absent from court presents a difficult judicial exercise. 
Even assuming that deterrence could be achieved, it may be a 
misplaced value in most structural challenges. Although the Supreme 
Court’s structural jurisprudence has become more analytically formal, 
it is often far from consistent or clear. It often fails to provide 
Congress notice of exactly which structures are verboten and thus 
limits intentional or even negligent structural violations. For instance, 
in the Appointments Clause context, Congress has, with one notable 
exception,194 generally failed to perceive correctly whether an officer 
was an inferior or principal officer or whether a particular officer was 
a “head of department.”195 Congress’s failure is understandable 
because the Supreme Court has provided two principles for 
determining a government official’s status—one based on an official’s 
importance and the other based on her subordination to other 
officials—that may lead to two different results,196 and it has also 
altered descriptions of which administrative entities constitute 
“departments.”197 The Court itself has recently conceded that its 
 
Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 08-861, Docket, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-861.htm 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2013). Because the executive branch typically seeks to uphold the 
constitutionality of federal legislation, the executive branch’s arguments may often 
advocate an expansive view of Congress’s powers (perhaps at the President’s expense), 
whether in structuring the administrative state or otherwise. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3166–70. Usually, litigation decisions are left to the Department of Justice, not any 
particular agency. See Kirti Datla & Richard Ravesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 96 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 800–01 (2013). 
 193. Cf. Kagan, supra note 129, at 2273 (“[N]o President can hope (even with the 
assistance of close aides) to monitor the agencies so closely as to substitute all his 
preferences for those of the bureaucracy.”). 
 194. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam). In Buckley, the 
legislation called for the blatantly unconstitutional appointment of six FEC 
commissioners. Despite the Appointment Clause’s clear requirement that the President 
nominate and the Senate confirm principal officers, the legislation called for the entire 
Congress to confirm two commissioners nominated by the President, the President pro 
tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House. See id. at 113; see also infra note 291 
(describing how the constitutional issue concerning FEC’s appointments was raised and 
ignored). 
 195. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 186–88 (1995). 
 196. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
 197. The Court’s definition of “department” continues to expand its unclear contours 
and affects who is permitted to appoint inferior officers. See Barnett, Appointment with 
Trouble, supra note 38, at 1468–81. 
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Article III jurisprudence has “not been entirely consistent.”198 And 
the undulation of the Court’s formalistic and functional approaches to 
the President’s removal power under Article II may excuse Congress 
from providing any particular decision much weight.199 Yet, to its 
credit, Congress has, at times, sought to comply with the Court’s 
structural limiting principles once the Court has announced them.200 
Considering the Court’s unclear jurisprudence and Congress’s general 
lack of apparent willfulness, little basis may exist for deterring 
Congress from failing to adhere to jurisprudence that has been 
labeled “incoherent,”201 “inconsistent,”202 and “ad hoc.”203 
III.  STRUCTURAL REMEDIES 
These remedial values can help to reveal the success or failure of 
specific structural-defect remedies. Below, I examine several 
structural remedies from the six most significant and recent judicial 
decisions in which the courts have held that a violation of the 
Appointments Clause, the President’s removal powers, or Article III 
occurred.204 To ease the reader’s comparison of similar remedies, I 
 
 198. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011); see also id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting that the “multifactors relied upon today seem to have entered our 
jurisprudence almost randomly”). 
 199. See Barnett, Independent Agency, supra 38, at 1356–58, 1367–69. 
 200. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3183 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that during the nine-year period that the Court’s 
jurisprudence suggested that Congress could not limit the President’s power to remove 
executive officers, Congress did not protect officers from at-will removal). 
 201. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1517 (1991). 
 202. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without Principle: A Comment on the Burger 
Court’s Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1038, 1097 (1987). 
 203. See David M. Drisen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 113 (2009). Although the value of punishment is similar to 
deterrence, it is not identical. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal 
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 363 (2003). Punishment seems even more inappropriate, 
given Congress’s lack of intentional or willful structural violations. See DOBBS, supra note 
117, at 204. 
 204. As noted, other less common separation-of-powers challenges are occasionally 
successful. See supra note 2. This Article limits itself to the more common Article III, 
appointments, and officer-removal challenges. Likewise, I have ignored challenges by 
federal officials for back pay because that remedy generally satisfies remedial values. See 
supra note 56. I also do not address Bowsher v. Synar in depth in this Section, see infra 
note 216, because the statute at issue contained specific fallback provisions in anticipation 
of structural challenges and thus presents a different scenario than other cases. See 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718 (1986) (“Anticipating constitutional challenge to 
these procedures, the Act also contains a ‘fallback’ deficit reduction process to take effect 
‘[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are 
invalidated.’ ”). 
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have divided those decisions between (1) those whose remedies did 
not require a legislative or executive response to a structural violation 
because the Court cured the structural defect and (2) those whose 
remedies required congressional or executive action because the 
Court did not cure any, or all, of the structural defect. As illuminated 
below, this remedial feature often, but not always, distinguishes more 
successful structural remedies from less successful ones and suggests, 
as discussed later, a relatively straightforward way of improving 
structural remedies.205 
A. Severing the Structural Violation 
In three recent decisions, the courts’ remedies did not require the 
legislature or the executive to respond and cure a structural defect. 
Instead, the courts either severed statutory provisions to cure 
structural defects for administrative agencies or otherwise limited the 
statutory reach of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction in an as-applied 
structural challenge to only those claims that could be heard in 
compliance with Article III. The remedy in two of these decisions—
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB and Intercollegiate Broadcasting 
Systems v. Copyright Royalty Board206—largely, if not completely, 
failed to fulfill the remedial values discussed above (i.e., 
compensation, incentive to litigate, and deterrence) because Congress 
was not required to confront its constitutional violation and because 
the prevailing party was left in no better (or indeed perhaps a worse) 
position than it was before the challenge. But a similar remedy in 
Stern v. Marshall207 revealed that a minimalist remedy can be more, if 
not entirely, effective in satisfying key remedial values, at least in 
some jurisdiction-based challenges. 
1.  Free Enterprise Fund 
As previously noted, Free Enterprise Fund concerned the 
PCAOB’s investigation of the plaintiff accounting firm.208 The 
plaintiff, supported in the litigation by a nonprofit organization, 
argued that the board’s significant independence from the SEC, 
which in turn was largely independent of the President, improperly 
 
 205. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 206. 684 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 
2013) (No. 12-928). 
 207. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 208. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149 
(2010). 
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impeded the President’s supervisory powers under Article II.209 The 
Court agreed, holding that two tiers of “tenure protection” between 
the board and the President (one implied tier for the SEC and one 
express tier for the board) were too much.210 Instead of enjoining the 
board from taking any actions under SOX, as the plaintiffs had 
requested, the Court merely stripped the PCAOB members of their 
protection from removal from office by the SEC, thus rendering the 
board’s members removable at will by the SEC.211 The Court then 
remanded the matter to the board, which retained all of its 
substantive powers.212 
The Court’s remedy failed to satisfy the first remedial value in 
that it provided no compensation for past harm and incomplete 
prospective enforcement of the safeguard. To be sure, the Court 
prevented some future harm by invalidating the limitations on 
removal. But, as with challenges to an agency’s substantive powers, 
the regulated party was not compensated for the litigation and 
investigation costs (excluding the litigation costs from judicial 
proceedings) that occurred under the improperly structured board. 
The regulated party did not even obtain a new proceeding from the 
Court because the Court merely remanded the matter for continued 
review before a now-properly structured board comprised of the 
same personnel.213 The new proceedings thus picked up where the 
“tainted” proceedings left off, meaning that the remedy did not even 
ensure that the structural harms would be prevented going forward 
for the investigation of the accounting firm. Nor did the remedy 
correct harms that might continue to flow from the board’s prior 
actions (whether those actions concerned related investigations, 
rulemaking, guidance documents, or other conduct), including those 
actions that came to bear directly on the plaintiff.214 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. at 3151–61. 
 211. See id. at 3161. 
 212. Id. at 3161, 3164. 
 213. See id. at 3164; see also id. at 3161 (noting that SOX “remains fully operative as a 
law with these tenure restrictions excised” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 214. That said, the accounting firm was ultimately able to settle its litigation with the 
PCAOB with an agreement by which the agency would withdraw inspection reports but 
continue to have the option of investigating any past or future conduct. See Michael Cohn, 
Beckstead and Watts Settles Inspection Case with PCAOB, ACCT. TODAY (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/Beckstead-Watts-Settles-Inspection-Case-PCAOB 
-57388-1.html. The settlement arose as the accounting firm sought in federal district court 
to nullify the inspection report that was prepared under the auspices of the PCAOB as 
originally established. See id. 
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Even if the Court’s remedy provides prospective enforcement, it 
may not fulfill the second remedial value of providing incentive to 
assert future structural challenges. In Free Enterprise Fund, for 
example, even if the nonprofit organization that joined the regulated 
party’s litigation paid all of the regulated party’s legal costs, the 
regulated party was ultimately placed in an arguably worse position 
than it was before the challenge. The investigation continued with a 
potentially more hostile board, whose members can now be removed 
at will by the SEC. The regulated party’s victory did nothing to alter 
the substantive landscape upon which the board can regulate, and it 
did not appear to open up a meaningful lobbying avenue for the 
regulated party to the SEC, which presumably has faith in the board’s 
members it appoints. At most, the unsettled nature of the proper 
remedies may have allowed the accounting firm to have a more 
favorable settlement position with the agency in this particular case.215 
The remedy also does not meaningfully deter Congress in the 
future. The Court could have chosen, as it did in Bowsher v. Synar, to 
invalidate the board’s substantive powers216 as the plaintiffs 
requested.217 A remedy that limited substantive powers would likely 
have provided more litigation incentive to regulated parties because 
the board would lose meaningful powers over investigations and 
 
 215. See id. (noting that the accounting firm had sought additional remedies in the 
district court and also that the agency spokeswoman’s explanation of the special 
circumstances of this dispute).  
 216. See Free Enter. Fund at 3162. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the Court 
responded to a structural defect by invalidating the Comptroller General’s executive 
powers, but leaving the Comptroller’s tenure protection in place. See id. at 733–35. Such a 
remedy is certainly more advantageous from the regulated party’s point of view. The 
affected party in Bowsher was a union for treasury employees who would be affected by 
the Comptroller General’s budget cuts. See id. at 719. The Act, as written, required the 
President to accept the budget cuts that the Comptroller sought after reviewing reports by 
the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. See id. at 
717–18. The Court held that the Comptroller was improperly exercising executive power 
because the Congress, not the President, could remove him from office. See id. at 722–34. 
The Court relied upon Congress’s statutory “fallback” provisions in its remedy; these 
provisions treated the Comptroller’s report merely as a recommendation that required 
congressional and presidential approval to become effective. See id. at 734–36. Prior to the 
Court’s decision, the union could meaningfully advance its argument before the 
Comptroller General alone or perhaps before the Office of Management and Budget and 
the Congressional Budget Office, both of which provided recommended cuts to the 
Comptroller General. After the Court’s decision, the union could seek to advance its 
position through more diverse, and perhaps more accessible, levers of power: the 
Comptroller, the House, the Senate, and the President. The Court’s remedy for a 
structural defect provided the impacted party with more avenues for altering the 
substantive decision and therefore more incentive to litigate. 
 217. See Brief for Petitioners at 62, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-891), 2009 
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enforcement directed at those very parties. Such a significant 
disruption of SOX’s enforcement would also have been likely to 
cause Congress to take note of its constitutional misstep. Even if the 
Court had merely required Congress itself to decide how to 
restructure the agency to comport with the Court’s decision, it would 
have caused Congress to bear the costs of legislating anew. When the 
Court solved the problem by disturbing the regulatory scheme as little 
as possible, it diluted incentives for future Congresses to consider 
structural concerns when drafting legislation. Thus, the Court’s 
decision in Free Enterprise Fund generally failed to satisfy the three 
key remedial values. 
To be sure, severing an unconstitutional portion of a statute may 
comport with understandable efforts to implement “fallback” 
congressional intent and limit disruption to federal programs.218 But 
severance in the structural context also undermines the three 
remedial values. Most importantly, in a case like Free Enterprise 
Fund, such a remedy (without more) provides the prevailing litigant 
no substantive benefit. Severance, in short, may create a superficial 
appearance that the Court carefully responded to the precise 
constitutional violation it identified. Yet a remedy that offers no 
advantages at all to the remedy-seeking plaintiff is not likely to foster 
remediation of similar structural wrongs in the future. 
2.  Intercollegiate Broadcasting System 
A recent ruling from the D.C. Circuit further demonstrates the 
problems that arise when courts apply the ineffective remedy from 
Free Enterprise Fund to other structural challenges. In Intercollegiate 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, the D.C. 
Circuit held that Copyright Royalty Judges (“CRJs”) were not 
properly appointed by the Librarian of Congress because they were 
principal, as opposed to inferior, officers.219 Principal officers, unlike 
inferior officers, must be nominated by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate.220 According to the court, CRJs were principal officers 
because of their substantive ratemaking powers and their protection 
from removal from office by the Librarian of Congress.221 The remedy 
the plaintiff sought in the case is not clear, but the plaintiff appears to 
 
 218. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006)). 
 219. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013) (No. 12-928). 
 220. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2. 
 221. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1336. 
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have wanted the court to invalidate the underlying ratemaking 
decision based on the structural defect or, if it’s structural challenge 
was not successful, to remand the matter to the Copyright Royalty 
Board with certain instructions on how to assess proper rates.222 The 
D.C. Circuit, however, decided to remedy the violation “with as little 
disruption as possible”223 by providing the same remedy as the 
Supreme Court provided in Free Enterprise Fund.224 The D.C. Circuit 
invalidated the limitations on the Librarian of Congress’s power to 
remove the CRJs,225 thereby rendering them inferior officers, and 
remanded the matter for a new determination by those same 
judges.226 As described below, this remedy was ineffective, failing to 
achieve two of the three remedial purposes that underpin the law of 
remedies—litigation incentive and deterrence. 
Regarding the first remedial value, the remedy in Intercollegiate 
Broadcasting System compensated Intercollegiate in a roundabout 
way. These judges were improperly appointed as principal officers by 
a department head. The D.C. Circuit later demoted them to inferior 
officers, but they were never appointed as inferior officers. Yet, 
despite this failing, the protection from removal that the judges had 
when the Librarian of Congress appointed them may have benefited 
Intercollegiate. The judges’ independence would likely have led the 
Librarian to be even more careful with the appointments because of 
the Librarian’s more limited ability to control the judges. The 
Librarian was clearly identifiable as the appointing party and 
responsible for the choice. In short, although the original 
appointment was unconstitutional, the appointment exceeded the 
underlying principles that the Appointments Clause intends to 
further—creating political accountability in an identifiable individual 
for inferior-officer appointments.227 Moreover, the court remanded 
for a new determination, not merely continued proceedings, and 
thereby provided Intercollegiate with the structural rights that it was 
entitled to receive in the first instance.228 
But, as in Free Enterprise Fund, the remedy fails to provide 
incentive to seek redress for future litigants. By invalidating the 
 
 222. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 18, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d 
1332 (No. 11-1083), 2011 WL 3918320. 
 223. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1336. 
 224. See id. at 1334. 
 225. See id. at 1342. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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statutory protections from at-will removal and remanding the matter 
to the very CRJs who can now be removed at will, the D.C. Circuit 
sent the prevailing litigant to potentially hostile judges. The extent to 
which the judges are actually hostile may be unknowable, even to 
them. But if the court’s remedy applies in similar contexts, the specter 
of hostility that looms over follow-up proceedings would likely give 
most regulated parties pause before asserting structural challenges.229 
After all, Intercollegiate received no other relief: no damages, no 
attorneys’ fees, and, despite its request, no substantive instructions for 
the judges on remand.230 Nothing prevents the Copyright Royalty 
Board from imposing the same rates as it imposed in the original 
proceeding, and it could even do so without altering any of its 
reasoning or conclusions. Moreover, Intercollegiate will then face the 
prospect of taking yet another appeal—with its costs and attorneys’ 
fees—to have the D.C. Circuit address the substance of its claims. 
Although the President and the Librarian of Congress gained power 
(whether real or theoretical) from the decision, Intercollegiate has 
gained little, if anything, from the challenge. 
The D.C. Circuit’s remedy also fails to deter Congress from 
creating other unconstitutional appointments in the first instance. 
Here, Congress permitted a department head to appoint principal 
officers. But Congress encounters no meaningful repercussions 
because of its constitutional violation. Congress has no need to take 
any action to avoid costs to the administrative state or to pay 
damages. Instead, the D.C. Circuit altered the statutory scheme to 
create, in its words, “as little disruption as possible.”231 Should other 
courts take similar action, future Congresses would have little 
incentive to ensure structural safeguards, including those under the 
Appointments Clause, when the courts will correct a problem of 
Congress’s making. 
The D.C. Circuit also did little to reinforce respect for the 
Appointments Clause while unnecessarily denigrating another 
constitutional safeguard. Instead of requiring Congress to confront 
the appointments issue with new legislation, the D.C. Circuit’s focus 
on limited disruption of the statutory scheme led it to concentrate on 
a different structural safeguard—the executive branch’s ability to 
supervise subordinate officers. While severing the protections from 
 
 229. Cf. Friedland, supra note 169, at 614 (discussing the hesitancy of parties to 
question adjudicators’ impartiality, despite grounds to do so); Sparling, supra note 169, at 
479–80. 
 230. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1341–42. 
 231. See id. at 1337. 
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removal rendered the CRJs inferior for purposes of the 
Appointments Clause, it simultaneously invalidated these otherwise 
constitutional protections from removal. 
Although the Supreme Court struck down one of the two layers 
of tenure protections in Free Enterprise Fund,232 it did not do so based 
on an Appointments Clause violation.233 Instead, its remedy related to 
Congress’s provision of too much independence to PCAOB by 
cocooning PCAOB within two layers of protection from removal, so 
that the removal-related remedy directly targeted the structural 
defect.234 But in the case of the CRJs, they had only one tier of tenure 
protection (because the President can remove the Librarian of 
Congress at will)235 and thus a constitutional form of independence.236 
Free Enterprise Fund, therefore, did not require its remedy here, and 
by relying on that decision, the D.C. Circuit hobbled the CRJs’ 
independence despite the constitutionality of that independence. 
By applying an ill-fitting remedy, the D.C. Circuit also created 
new problems. CRJs are now subject to political pressure when 
deciding matters because of their ability to be removed at will by the 
Librarian of Congress, whom the President, in turn, can remove at 
will. Despite decades of criticism concerning the unfairness of 
copyright-royalty proceedings,237 the D.C. Circuit’s remedy brings the 
fairness of those proceedings into question because political actors 
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 234. See id. at 3161. 
 235. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1341. 
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can assert more control over the hearings’ outcomes.238 To be sure, 
the increased political nature of the proceedings may not raise due 
process concerns because the CRJs preside over ratemaking,239 not 
adjudicatory, hearings.240 But the D.C. Circuit should have at least 
considered its chosen remedy’s effect on the fairness of those 
proceedings that Congress has long sought to improve.241 
3.  Stern 
Unlike in Free Enterprise Fund and Intercollegiate Broadcasting 
System, a minimalist remedy in Stern v. Marshall (although one that 
did not require the severance of any statutory language) was more 
effective in satisfying key remedial values.242 The Stern Court, as the 
prevailing party requested, invalidated a bankruptcy court’s order 
that resolved a state-law claim in the debtor’s favor.243 The Court did 
so because the bankruptcy court’s statutory jurisdiction over the 
state-law claim as part of the court’s “core” bankruptcy jurisdiction 
violated Article III.244 By invalidating the bankruptcy court’s order, 
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the Court gave a later-in-time state-court judgment that favored the 
prevailing private party (i.e., the creditor) preclusive effect over the 
earlier bankruptcy-court judgment.245 
Because the prevailing party obtained exactly what he had 
requested, the Court’s remedy appears to have been sufficient for him 
to challenge the bankruptcy court’s structure. Familiar and routine 
challenges to state and federal court jurisdiction suggest that 
remedies that provide either preclusive effect to a particular 
judgment or proceedings in a new forum create sufficient litigation 
incentive. This is so because the parties would then be left to litigate 
the issue in what the prevailing party perceives as a more favorable 
forum, whether because of a prevailing judgment or the beneficial 
reputation of the judge or juries. Indeed, the general availability of a 
new forum is what creates more incentive than may exist with other 
structural challenges, such as in Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, 
where the prevailing party must return to the authority of the 
challenged officials.246 Aside from generally non-compensable 
litigation costs, the prevailing party that receives a new forum would 
also obtain all to which it was originally entitled and thus be generally 
compensated for the structural violation. 
The remedy also provided as much deterrence to Congress as 
exists for other substantive constitutional violations, even if that 
deterrence is rather insignificant. In Stern, the Court held that the 
particular kind of state-law claim was not properly before the 
bankruptcy court despite its statutory jurisdiction.247 The Court in 
essence established, as in other as-applied constitutional challenges, 
the constitutional limitations of the statutory grant of jurisdiction 
over “core” bankruptcy proceedings without severing any statutory 
language. Congress, as with most other applied challenges, likely feels 
little sting from the Court’s limits on the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy does little to deter Congress from 
violating Article III. Yet, this failure applies to many as-applied 
challenges, not only structural litigation. Moreover, given the Court’s 
admission in Stern that its Article III jurisprudence “has not been 
entirely consistent,”248 it may be largely impossible to deter Congress 
from stepping over boundaries that it cannot ascertain. Thus, a 
remedy that involves merely severance may be slightly more 
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successful, although not entirely so, in satisfying remedial values as 
part of a jurisdiction-based challenge concerning only private-party 
litigants than in the purely regulatory context. 
B. Requiring Legislative or Executive Action 
Structural remedies better satisfy remedial values for prevailing 
parties when courts require the political branches to respond to the 
structural violation with curative action. Such was the case in Ryder v. 
United States.249 But courts have often dulled the remedy’s 
effectiveness—for example in Buckley v. Valeo and, to a limited 
extent, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co.250—by validating past administrative actions and providing 
Congress lengthy stays of the judgment to fashion remedial 
legislation. By doing so, the courts have undermined the remedial 
values that are important to prevailing regulated parties. 
1.  Ryder 
In Ryder, the Supreme Court determined that civilian judges of 
the Coast Guard Court of Military Review were not properly 
appointed and thus were unauthorized to hear Ryder’s appeal for 
several drug-related convictions.251 The judges were inferior officers 
who were improperly appointed by the Department of 
Transportation’s General Counsel, not the Secretary of 
Transportation—a department head—as the Appointments Clause 
and governing statute required.252 Turning to the remedial questions, 
the Court unanimously held that Ryder was “entitled to a hearing 
before a properly appointed panel of that court.”253 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court rejected the “de facto officer doctrine,” which 
validates the actions of those acting under the color of official title 
despite an invalid appointment.254 The Court noted that the doctrine 
was limited to mere statutory, as opposed to constitutional, challenges 
brought only on collateral review.255 The Court also recognized that it 
had created a similar de facto doctrine—distinct from the de facto 
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officer doctrine—for constitutional, appointments-based challenges.256 
But the Court stated that it was “not inclined to extend” this other 
vague de facto doctrine beyond challenges to entire administrative or 
legislative bodies that implicated federal voting rights or elections.257 
For the most part, the Ryder Court’s remedy merits praise. The 
Court partially compensated Ryder and provided prospective 
enforcement of the safeguard by granting him a new hearing “before 
a properly appointed panel of that court.”258 This remedy, similar to 
specific performance in contract law, gave Ryder what he was entitled 
to receive in the first instance. In particular, the properly constituted 
panel might be different from the initial, improperly appointed panel; 
in this case, the rehearing would not be an empty gesture.259 And even 
if the same individuals were later appointed, their installation as 
adjudicators would have then undergone the political scrutiny that 
the Constitution requires. With the department head’s new 
appointments, the appointment power would be properly cabined in 
limited executive officers, thereby requiring identifiable executive 
officers to take the praise and blame for the appointment.260 To be 
sure, the remedy did not fully compensate the prevailing litigant 
because he did not receive any compensation for the past harm, 
whether dignitary or financial, in having to participate in 
unconstitutional proceedings. But this remedial failing is common in 
public-law litigation.261 
A new hearing before properly appointed officers likely provides 
as much litigation incentive as exists for other administrative-action 
challenges, even if the incentive is still relatively low. For instance, in 
the case of the Coast Guard judges, Congress had permitted the head 
of department—the Secretary of Transportation—to make the 
appointment, but he had failed to do so.262 The Secretary’s 
appointment of these officers after the Court’s decision took only a 
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minimal amount of administrative effort.263 Congress had authorized 
the appointment in a constitutional manner. The remedy—a hearing 
before properly appointed judges264—cures the concerns that arose 
from the improper enforcement of Congress’s legislation at little cost 
and tracks the remedy afforded for more common procedural 
violations.265 The challenger thus has as much incentive to challenge 
the structural defect as he or she would for challenging any other 
procedural administrative violation. Moreover, unlike with certain 
violations and remedies, the adjudicator, if later appointed (as is 
usual), arises from the challenge in a stronger position because the 
adjudicator is now unquestionably a properly appointed federal 
officer. This improved status should reduce a regulated party’s real or 
speculative fears of animus.266 This minimal level of incentive is not 
optimal, but at least it corresponds to incentive for procedural 
challenges and, if the appointment is cured of its defect, provides 
more incentive than exists for other structural challenges by 
ultimately elevating the status of the challenged officers. 
The remedy also has no need to deter Congress because 
Congress did not create an improper appointment. At the same time, 
the executive branch had to absorb the inefficiencies that redundant 
proceedings and a later proper appointment brought about, much as 
it must do after other successful administrative challenges. The 
remedy here of re-appointment may appear relatively minor, but it 
might be said so, too, is the transgression. Here, the wrong official 
within the department appointed the judges. The remedy’s symmetry 
with harm requires the executive to assume some costs for the 
violation, even if those costs are not onerous. Ultimately, the remedy 
was mostly successful in satisfying the three key remedial values. 
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2.  Buckley 
In contrast to the generally successful remedy in Ryder, the 
Court’s structural remedy in Buckley v. Valeo demonstrates that 
merely requiring one or more political branches to take curative 
action does not by itself guarantee the satisfaction of key remedial 
values. In Buckley, political parties and candidates challenged 
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended 
in 1974.267 The plaintiffs successfully argued that, among other things, 
none of the commissioners of the FEC were properly installed under 
the Appointments Clause.268 As a remedy, the Court invalidated the 
FEC’s executive powers (rulemaking, enforcement, and so forth)269 
but allowed the FEC to continue its quasi-legislative functions (data 
collection).270 The Court also stayed its judgment for thirty days to 
permit Congress to reconstitute the FEC.271 Moreover, without any 
briefing from the parties on the proper remedy,272 the Court granted 
the FEC’s past acts “de facto validity”273 and permitted the FEC to 
continue its executive functions during the period of the stay.274 The 
Buckley Court’s remedy succeeded in satisfying the three remedial 
desiderata only in part, and it also raised troubling implications. 
As to the first key remedial value, the Court’s remedy provided 
no compensation whatsoever to the prevailing parties, except in the 
form of limited prospective relief. Even in the face of a blatant 
constitutional structural defect, the Court provided all of the FEC’s 
past actions de facto validity, and because those past actions were 
deemed valid, the prevailing parties received no compensation for 
any harm the defect brought about.275 The Court later in Ryder stated 
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that the prevailing parties received the declaratory and injunctive 
relief that they had pursued.276 But the Buckley plaintiffs did not 
obtain all that they sought. They also requested complete invalidation 
of the FEC and its past actions.277 True, the regulated parties, without 
further action by Congress, would not have to worry about future 
FEC regulatory actions. But the Court’s awarded relief afforded no 
compensation for past harms or full enforcement of the safeguard 
going forward because past agency actions remained in place. The 
Appointments Clause, the bastion of separation of powers, 
apparently has low walls and shallow moats. 
The remedy provided, as to the second key remedial value, only 
limited incentive for future structural challenges. The constriction of 
the agency’s prospective powers provided some incentive because if 
Congress failed to act within thirty days, the prevailing parties would 
have hobbled the FEC by having its significant enforcement and 
rulemaking powers invalidated.278 Nevertheless, the prevailing party 
continued to be subject to the agency’s previous actions because of 
their de facto validity, thus dulling the regulated party’s victory. 
The Court’s remedy likewise created only a limited deterrent 
effect and thereby did not fully satisfy the third key remedial value. 
The Court required Congress to reconstitute the FEC in a 
constitutional manner.279 If it failed to do so, the FEC would lose all 
executive power going forward.280 But the Court’s stay, while 
respecting interbranch comity,281 limited the deterrent effect of its 
remedy because it gave Congress a chance to mend its ways without 
suffering any harm for the structural violation.282 Indeed, unlike the 
scenarios in which executive officials have failed to execute 
Congress’s properly established appointments,283 the Court 
invalidated no agency order or action whatsoever. As long as 
Congress acted within thirty days, it was to be as if Congress never 
violated the Constitution at all. A structural-redesign grace period 
 
Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 1185 (2011) (“[Buckley’s] remedy, then, 
did not help anyone who may have been injured by the improper appointment . . . up to 
that point.”). 
 276. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183. 
 277. See Reply Brief of Appellants, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 
171458, at *111. 
 278. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142–43. 
 279. See id.  
 280. See id. at 136–43.  
 281. See Nagel, supra note 34, at 718.  
 282. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142–43.  
 283. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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implicitly tells Congress that it may blatantly violate the 
Constitution’s structural safeguards (or at least push structural 
boundaries to the maximum) and then later create a proper agency, if 
it acts fast enough, without any adverse consequences at all. 
Much of the remedial inadequacy in Buckley comes from its 
improper validation of the agency’s actions. As the Supreme Court 
later suggested in Ryder, the Buckley Court’s reliance on a de facto 
validity doctrine—similar to, but apparently distinct from, the de 
facto officer doctrine—was misplaced.284 The de facto officer doctrine 
validates the actions of “a person acting under color of official title” 
despite a statutory defect concerning an officer’s appointment in a 
collateral attack on a prior judgment.285 The purpose of the doctrine is 
to prevent, based on “technical defects,”286 chaos to the administrative 
state and uncertainty for parties that have relied on the individual’s 
rulings.287 But the defect in Buckley was constitutional, not technical 
or statutory, and concerned the formation of a new independent 
agency. The Court provided no evidence of chaos that would arise 
without the validation of prior actions. Indeed, the agency was 
relatively new and had yet to engage in significant regulatory activity 
(outside of issuing numerous advisory opinions288) despite upcoming 
federal elections.289 Buckley, in other words, was not a suitable 
candidate for application of a de facto validity doctrine based on 
either the kind of structural defect at issue or its hypothesized ill 
effects. 
The Ryder Court, however, twice suggested that a de facto 
validity doctrine—as opposed to the de facto officer doctrine—may 
apply when the structural challenge extends to an entire body where 
 
 284. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184 (1995). 
 285. See id. at 180; see also Clokey, supra note 51, at 1122 (citing EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 
241 (N.D. Ill. 1980)) (noting rejected challenges to the expired term of an EEOC 
administrator). 
 286. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180 (quoting 36A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees 
§ 578 (1984)). 
 287. See ALBERT CONSTANTINEAU, A TREATISE ON THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE 4 
(1910); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without 
Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 595, 600 (2001). 
 288. For a collection of the FEC’s advisory opinions in 1975 alone, see Advisory 
Opinions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao;jsessionid 
=C6860AFE8044A01A86808798736E97AE;jsessionid=9F6EAB2EE530E6E9AA17C2937
948D86F?SUBMIT=year&YEAR=1975 (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
 289. See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (noting that the 
amendments became effective in October 1974 and issuing an opinion to the constitutional 
challenge in January 1975). 
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“grave disruption or inequity” would arise.290 Although applying the 
doctrine in such situations may honor settled legal interests that 
occurred prior to the litigation, it creates a perverse relationship 
between the remedy and the significance of the violation: the more 
striking (and often obvious) the structural defect and its effects, the 
more insignificant the judicial remedy. To be sure, much harm can 
arise from the invalid appointment of those who head an agency. But 
for that reason, Congress, contrary to its actions in Buckley, should be 
attentive to the required (and relatively clear) strictures for a proper 
appointment.291 Even with the appointment of lower-level officers, 
the invalid appointment may be obvious, and the harm from 
improper appointments can be significant.292 An inverse remedy-to-
harm paradigm, in other words, actively seeks not to compensate and 
enforce, to provide incentive, or to deter based on perceived chaos—
chaos that arises directly from Congress’s inattention to structural 
safeguards. The safeguards, contrary to the Court’s panegyrics to 
their importance, look like technicalities and merely matters of 
etiquette and protocol that do not warrant full prospective 
enforcement. 
This is not to say that a court’s consideration of administrative 
chaos should be irrelevant in determining an equitable remedy.293 For 
instance, the disruption to the administrative state may be especially 
high in the context of already-final adjudications because the need to 
preserve settled legal interests is great. Of particular significance, the 
retroactive invalidation of final orders concerning parties who did not 
assert a structural challenge would provide no compensation or 
incentive to the prevailing party in the structural litigation. Any 
additional deterrent effect or judicial respect for the safeguard that 
 
 290. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–85. 
 291. After all, Congress acknowledged and ignored the arguments that the 
appointments were blatantly unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 137–38 
(1974); Various Measures Relating to Federal Election Reform: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and the Committee on Rules and Administration 
on S. 23, S. 343, S. 372, S. 1094, S. 1189, S. 1303, S. 1355 & S.J. Res. 110, 93d Cong. 352–54 
(GAO memorandum); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee 
on House Administration on H.R. 7612, S. 372, and Related Election Reform Bills, 93d 
Cong. 141, 161, 192, 229 (discussing the functional necessity of cross-branch 
appointments). 
 292. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (providing constitutional appointments of 
Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”)); John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 915 (2009) (noting that the Director of the 
Patent and Trademark Office’s appointment of APJs was almost certainly unconstitutional 
because the Director was clearly not a head of department). 
 293. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 287, at 600–01. 
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would arise from a stronger remedy is probably unlikely to be worth 
the price of upset legal interests. Likewise, a strong remedy 
unencumbered by a de facto validity doctrine would likely have no 
deterrent effect if the structural defect arose only through the 
Supreme Court’s announcement of a new principle or rule (such as a 
new, narrow reading of “head of department”). Other scenarios may 
exist in which the de facto validity doctrine properly limits remedies. 
But remedial values should be part of the remedial calculus, as the 
courts seek to balance chaos, third-party interests, and the overall 
effectiveness of the remedy with respect to the prevailing party, 
potential future parties, and the political branches. 
3.  Northern Pipeline 
The Court’s remedy in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co. generally satisfied key remedial values—
better than the remedy in Buckley, but not as well as the one in 
Ryder. In Northern Pipeline, the Court ordered the dismissal of a 
debtor’s action in the bankruptcy court to recover money from a non-
creditor third party.294 In response to the third party’s challenge to the 
bankruptcy court’s authority to hear the debtor’s action, the Court 
prospectively invalidated the bankruptcy court’s extensive statutory 
jurisdiction and stayed its judgment to provide Congress time to 
formulate a suitable solution.295 
The remedy provided sufficient compensation, prospective 
enforcement, and incentives to litigate by giving the prevailing party 
what it requested and to what it would be entitled in other 
jurisdictional disputes. The prevailing party in Northern Pipeline had 
the debtor’s action dismissed in such a manner that the debtor could 
re-file the action in a state or federal trial court.296 As a tactical 
matter, the non-debtor third party most likely sought to obtain a 
more favorable venue before a non-specialized (and, most likely, an 
Article III) judge, as compared to what non-debtors often perceive as 
debtor-friendly bankruptcy judges.297 By giving the prevailing party 
 
 294. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56–57 (1982) 
(plurality opinion).  
 295. See id. at 56–57, 88–89. 
 296. See id. at 56–57.  
 297. Bankruptcy courts are, fairly or not, often perceived as debtor-friendly. See H.R. 
REP. No. 95-595, at 90–91 (1977); Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy—The Last Environmental 
Loophole?, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 379, 406 (1993); Martin Bienenstock, Marc Kieselstein & 
David Fischer, Recharacterization & Asset Securitization: “When Is a Duck a Duck,” 1 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 575, 583 (2003); Kevin P. McDowell, Note, Statutory Authority 
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exactly what it requested (i.e., dismissal of the current action and 
potentially a new hearing in another forum), the Court afforded 
similarly situated prevailing parties incentive to litigate by giving 
them the ability to litigate in a proper forum. This remedy would 
typically arise in analogous jurisdictional disputes and give the 
prevailing party that to which it was originally entitled had the 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction not violated Article III. 
The Court also achieved some level of deterrence with its 
remedy.298 The plurality, contrary to the wishes of two concurring 
justices, invalidated the statutory provision that granted the 
bankruptcy court broad jurisdiction over all “civil proceedings arising 
under title 11.”299 Going forward, this remedy left bankruptcy 
proceedings up in the air because the bankruptcy courts lost their 
statutory jurisdiction over all claims, and the Court gave Congress a 
period of time (and an extension upon the Solicitor General’s 
request) to create a constitutional bankruptcy system.300 During the 
Court’s stay, the judiciary passed emergency bankruptcy rules,301 and 
Congress enacted new legislation more than two years later.302 
Congress was required to create new law as to the bankruptcy 
system’s structure, a process that was time-consuming and 
controversial.303 Such a far-reaching remedy serves to deter Congress 
from making other mistakes of the same ilk. 
But the Court’s accommodation for Congress may have also 
encouraged legislative lethargy. Congress in fact took more than two 
years to enact curative legislation.304 Despite the likely impossibility 
of proving a causal relationship between remedial limitations and 
congressional inaction, courts going forward should learn from the 
 
for Bankruptcy Judges to Conduct Jury Trials: Fact of Fiction? In re United Missouri Bank 
of Kansas City, N.A., 56 MO. L. REV. 729, 745 (1991). 
 298. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 89–90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 299. See id. at 54 (plurality opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 Supp. IV)). 
 300. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982) 
(mem.). 
 301. See John E. Matthews, The Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy Courts: 
Constitutional Implications in the Wake of Grandfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 43, 54 (1991). 
 302. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603 (2012) (discussing the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984). 
 303. See, e.g., Lawrence P. King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of 
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 107–20 (1983). 
 304. See Katelyn Knight, Note, Equitable Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 253, 258 (2009) (noting that Congress took more than two years after 
Northern Pipeline to pass the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984). 
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example and consider whether mitigating the effect of a structural 
defect may affect the political branches’ response. The point is not 
that delay and emergency rules are always improper. Instead, the 
point is that congressional deterrence and lethargy should be 
additional factors in the courts’ remedial analysis. 
IV.  RESPONDING TO STRUCTURAL REMEDIATION’S CHALLENGES 
The foregoing discussion reveals various structural remedies and 
their varied success in satisfying the three key remedial values. These 
decisions demonstrate that no one structural remedy is likely to be 
wholly satisfactory in all contexts, although certain remedies perform 
better than others. By considering these decisions and their structural 
remedies, courts and scholars are in a better position to identify the 
problematic structural remedies and contexts and then formulate 
appropriate responses. 
So what are the potentially appropriate responses? Courts could 
proceed down three paths: (1) improving structural remedies and the 
discussion of remedial values, (2) limiting the nature of the safeguard 
and the rhetoric that surrounds it, or (3) reconsidering what interest, 
if any, regulated parties should have in structural challenges.305 
A. Improving Remedies 
Below I consider three possible ways to improve structural 
remedies. First, I suggest that the parties brief the issue of a proper 
remedy to bring the issue into focus. Second, courts could provide 
more significant equitable remedies, such as requiring Congress to 
cure the structural defect if the agency is to continue acting or 
invalidating the past actions of an improperly structured agency. 
These and similar remedies, as indicated from the analysis in Part III, 
are more likely to lead to the satisfaction of key remedial values. 
Finally, Congress should perhaps consider providing statutory 
remedies, such as scheduled damages. 
1.  Briefing Remedial Options 
A relatively easy way to improve structural remediation would 
be to have the parties brief the issue of remedies. Briefing the issue, if 
 
 305. These paths need not be mutually exclusive. For instance, remedies may improve 
in certain scenarios but not in others, and judicial candor can help explain why the 
remedies must differ. Or, for another example, a party may brief the issues for the court, 
but the court may still be candid about not awarding requested relief. I shall, nonetheless, 
discuss each path separately for ease of discussion. 
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nothing else, ensures that courts confront remedial options and 
values. Notably, structural remedies have failed most in these 
situations—such as in Free Enterprise Fund, Intercollegiate 
Broadcasting System, and Buckley—in which the prevailing party 
neither received the relief that it requested nor briefed remedies or 
remedial values in any detail.306 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist lamented 
in internal conference memos the lack of briefing as to the Court’s de 
facto validity ruling in Buckley, which largely undermined remedial 
values and was later critiqued and limited by a unanimous Court in 
Ryder.307 Because courts often ignore the prevailing parties’ 
perfunctory request for relief and provide remedies that fail to satisfy 
key remedial values, the parties have incentive to (and should) 
engage the courts in their arguments about the nature of an 
appropriate, meaningful structural remedy in light of the three key 
remedial values. By creating a conversation, as Ryder suggests, the 
remedies are more likely to match the Court’s rhetoric about the 
underlying rights and fulfill remedial values. 
This briefing may prove most useful after a court has established 
the nature of the structural defect.308 Parties may contest whether 
several structural defects exist in their briefing on the merits. For 
instance, in Free Enterprise Fund, the plaintiffs asserted challenges 
based on the Appointments Clause and the President’s supervisory 
powers.309 The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs only on their 
latter claim.310 The kind of violation could, of course, likely influence 
the appropriate remedy. Had the Court remanded the matter to the 
D.C. Circuit to address the remedial issue, the parties could have 
briefed the issue of remedies separately from the structural safeguard 
involved and considered germane remedial values (such as those 
discussed here and perhaps others, such as chaos, practicality of 
enforcement, and comity for the other branches). 
 
 306. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 62, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130; Reply Brief of 
Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 171458, at 
*111 (providing some discussion on congressional intent and the propriety of severance 
and then stating that “the Commission itself should be invalidated”); Brief for Appellants 
at 17, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (Nos. 11-1083, 11-1103), 2011 WL 3918320. 
 307. See supra note 272; supra text accompanying note 284. 
 308. My thanks to Professor Bill Araiza for this insight. 
 309. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147–48.  
 310. Id. at 3149, 3151.  
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2.  Liberalized Equitable Remedies 
Beyond engaging with the remedial issue, courts could begin to 
provide more potent injunctive relief to render the underlying norms 
more meaningful. For instance, courts could require Congress to 
reconfigure a structurally sound agency, as the Court did in Northern 
Pipeline and Buckley. To strengthen the effect of requiring Congress 
to cure structural defects, courts could also limit their reliance on 
stays and de facto validity doctrines that seek to mitigate the effects 
of a more potent remedy. Doing so, as discussed above, provides 
increased incentives for those seeking redress because if Congress 
fails to reconfigure the structurally defective agency, regulated parties 
may not face future regulatory oversight. By placing regulatory 
programs into jeopardy and requiring Congress to confront its 
mistakes, the Court also provides a remedy that increases deterrence 
of wrongdoing. To be sure, the effect of remedies on Congress’s 
motivation raises an empirical question which is probably impossible 
to answer.311 But requiring Congress to clean up its own mess might 
well lead the political branches to take structural safeguards more 
seriously. Likewise, providing wholly new proceedings before a 
properly fashioned agency as part of the injunctive relief—as in 
Ryder—would provide increased enforcement of the norm (through a 
specific-performance-like mechanism) and thus help achieve, at least 
in part, compensatory values and better achieve future enforcement 
for the prevailing party. The courts would be able to provide this 
more effective response to structural defects by using their familiar 
equitable powers that should generally present fewer concerns over 
judicial aggrandizement. 
The awarding of more aggressive injunctive relief, however, 
comes with concerns. Aside from concerns about judicial 
overreaching,312 hobbling an agency may be too severe a sanction 
 
 311. In other contexts, Congress has responded to the Court’s constitutional rulings 
and attempted to address the Court’s concerns, suggesting that the Court’s decisions do 
influence Congress in later legislation. For instance, after the Court invalidated child-
pornography prohibitions on First Amendment grounds, Congress passed new, more 
tailored legislation that adequately responded to the Court’s concerns. See United States 
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 289–91, 307 (2008) (describing how Congress sought to draft 
new child-pornography provisions in light of the Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which struck down prior prohibitions on child 
pornography). Likewise, after the Court struck down Congress’s attempt to regulate 
minors’ ability to view pornography in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), Congress tried 
a second time to enact better-tailored prohibitions in the Child Online Protection Act 
(“COPA”). See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (affirming the judgment that 
kept the preliminary injunction in place that prevented enforcement of COPA). 
 312. See BICKEL, supra note 187, at 111–98. 
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from the perspective of others whose conduct the agencies regulate. 
These other parties may well have ordered their businesses around 
the agencies’ regulations and guidance.313 By providing an open-
ended period during which the agency lacks power, other regulated 
parties would be uncertain whether to alter their businesses to 
become viable market participants unbounded by the regulatory state 
or to await curative legislation that will maintain the regulatory status 
quo.314 
The sanction may also be an inappropriate judicial remedy 
because, as a matter of realpolitik, it favors those that seek to limit 
administrative action. Either house of Congress (or the President) 
could stop a controversial agency from functioning by withholding 
support for curative legislation. Such a remedy would permit that 
single house (or the President) to do what it (or he or she) could not 
otherwise do alone—abolish a particular agency.315 This possibility is 
not merely theoretical. Consider the recent structural challenge to the 
CFPB, established by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.316 If the remedy 
for the alleged structural violations was to invalidate all of the 
CFPB’s actions until the passage of curative legislation, the CFPB 
may well never rise again because Republicans, who have long been 
hostile to its existence and were the minority party when it was 
created, now control the House.317 
3.  Legislative Participation 
Because of the drawbacks associated with judicially crafted 
equitable relief, one possible response to this problem is for Congress 
to step in and provide complementary remedies by statute, largely 
freeing courts from having to worry about proper judicial 
 
 313. The Supreme Court, however, did not appear too troubled by settled legal 
interests in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NRLB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010), when it held that the 
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 314. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 604 (considering third parties’ interests when 
fashioning remedies). 
 315. See Gorod, supra note 16, at 924. 
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 317. See, e.g., Pat Garofalo, House Republicans Propose Cutting Consumer Protection 
Bureau and Foreclosure Prevention, THINK PROGRESS, (Apr. 13, 2012, 5:40 PM), http:// 
thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/04/13/464400/financial-services-budget-repeal 
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remediation. A statutory remedy could provide new incentives for 
litigants to seek redress by, for instance, providing scheduled, 
monetary damages. Because a structural harm is hard to quantify, 
scheduled damages (like liquidated damages) may serve a useful 
role.318 Scheduled damages permit the legislature to assign an amount 
that, in the legislature’s view, serves to compensate for past harms 
and to deter.319 The scheduled damages would thereby provide more 
incentive for regulated parties to seek redress. Along with injunctive 
relief to prevent future violations, such a monetary award would thus 
provide the regulated party with a remedy that promotes the three 
underlying remedial virtues.320 This approach would promote the 
“passive virtues” of a limited judiciary by permitting the legislature to 
develop more carefully crafted remedies.321  
As part of compensating prevailing parties with scheduled 
damages, Congress could also provide attorneys’ fees for a prevailing 
party under a similar rubric as found under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.322 Doing 
so would allow prevailing parties to obtain most of their litigation 
costs and place them on more equal footing with other kinds of 
constitutional litigation, such as those brought under the Civil Right 
Acts under Title 42 of the U.S. Code.323 Providing attorneys’ fees 
alone would not, however, likely provide sufficient incentive for 
regulated parties to bring structural challenges. Such recovery would 
place the party only in the same, not a better, position as it was before 
the challenge. A significant monetary award on top of the cost of 
bringing an action would be necessary to provide sufficient incentive, 
especially in light of possible perceived damage to the relationship 
between the regulated party and the official or agency. 
That said, even if substantial scheduled awards and attorneys’ 
fees provide compensation and incentive to litigants, they still may 
not prevent Congress from transgressing constitutional limits. Such 
 
 318. See Bray, supra note 104, at 755–57 (noting that scheduled damages, a form of 
“announc[ed]” remedies, may not be optimal, but they are “well suited to the world of the 
second best”). 
 319. See id. at 761–63 (arguing that scheduled damages can be more beneficial from a 
compensatory and distributive justice theory for difficult-to-quantify harms). 
 320. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 321. See BICKEL, supra note 187, 111–98. 
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awards, whether paid from an agency’s budget or the U.S. Treasury, 
would not likely deter Congress. Neither legislative house nor its 
members would be meaningfully affected by damages even in the 
high six- or seven-figures range. Scheduled damages, therefore, may 
fail to achieve one of their three key purposes. But considering the 
unknown or limited deterrent effect of remedies on Congress,324 this 
remedial failure in the structural context may be of limited 
importance, given such a remedy’s other virtues. 
Perhaps more significantly, Congress is unlikely to create a 
monetary remedy that is meant to incentivize challenges to 
congressional authority. Not only has Congress been leery of 
extending damage awards and causes of action that implicate the 
federal purse,325 but it would almost certainly be hesitant to help 
regulated parties bring suits that are meant to hamstring legislative 
discretion. Instead, Congress has addressed remedial concerns only 
by establishing some “fallback” provisions that dictate results when 
the Court invalidates a statutory provision.326 Thus, statutory 
damages, which may provide a generally successful remedy, stand 
little chance of enactment. 
B. Judicial Candor Concerning Safeguards’ Limitations 
The potential implausibility of scheduled damages and more 
meaningful equitable relief may be strong evidence that structural 
remedies cannot be rendered more consequential for regulated 
parties. Courts could concede that, despite judicial declarations of the 
importance of structural design,327 many safeguards are not 
meaningful for regulated parties because other considerations—such 
as regulatory chaos, sovereign immunity, and judicial minimalist 
remedies—are deemed more important than the key remedial values 
of compensation, litigation incentive, and deterrence. The 
preeminence of other values suggests that the safeguards serve 
primarily as aspirational guidelines for the political branches to follow 
when constructing administrative entities. If a branch of government 
seeks to vindicate those safeguards, the courts’ current remedies, 
which largely look to severance to avoid disturbance to the regulatory 
scheme, may well be sufficient to render structural norms meaningful 
 
 324. See Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the Public Would Lose 
Under the “Penalty Default Canon,” 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 724, 733 (2004) (suggesting 
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 325. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 134, at 614. 
 326. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1986). 
 327. See supra Part I. 
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to that branch of government. But, for pragmatic or historic reasons, 
judicial structural remedies often fail to validate individual interests. 
Despite the Court’s protestations, the safeguards may therefore be 
more akin to technicalities and protocol for regulated parties.328 
Limiting structural safeguards because of concerns over 
regulatory chaos would be consistent with Professor Levinson’s 
theory that aggressive remedies may lead to diminished rights.329 As 
Levinson noted when discussing constitutional remedies generally, as 
significant remedies increase the “price” of a violation, courts will 
find fewer violations.330 As fewer violations arise, the breadth and 
importance of the safeguard will decrease as the courts find various 
bases for finding no underlying right. 
Indeed, the Court has candidly limited structural challenges to 
administrative adjudication based on Article III, relying on various 
pragmatic factors to avoid ever finding a violation.331 It has thereby 
avoided having to decide the nature and scope of a suitable remedy. 
But, as a consequence, the Court has crafted a relatively impotent 
structural safeguard. For instance, in CFTC v. Schor,332 the Court 
found no structural violation after taking a functional approach that 
balanced several factors—including Congress’s reason for granting a 
non-Article III tribunal jurisdiction to hear certain claims and the 
significance of the incursion into the Article III courts’ authority.333 
To be sure, the Court may be criticized for not going one step further 
by acknowledging that individuals may find little value in Article III 
protections within the administrative context. But its decisions clearly 
reveal that because of functional or other prudential limitations, the 
safeguard may provide little or no litigation benefits to a party 
regulated by administrative agencies.334 And the regulated parties’ 
voluntary waiver of their Article III rights in that case (by agreeing to 
dismiss the claims in federal court and resolve the claims before the 
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agency) reveals that the parties’ understood the structural safeguard 
was of minimal importance to their other goals.335 In fact, the Court 
moved towards removing any lingering doubt over the limited reach 
of Article III into administrative adjudication in Stern, when it 
repeatedly distinguished agency adjudication as different in kind from 
the unconstitutional bankruptcy adjudication at issue (albeit without 
explaining why).336 
Judicial candor concerning structural safeguards’ and remedies’ 
limitations—such as in the Article III context of administrative 
adjudications—is preferable to the underlying doctrine’s intentional 
or subconscious obfuscation. As Professor Paul Gewirtz has cogently 
argued about constitutional remedies generally, the moral basis for 
judicial power and accountability is founded upon candor.337 A lack of 
candor might, at times, help avoid dignitary harms or public 
resistance.338 Yet the regulated parties would likely prefer to have an 
honest accounting of the norm and its remedial limitations instead of 
judicial blandishments, if for no other reason than to have better 
information when deciding whether to invest resources in future 
structural challenges.339 Furthermore, even if judicial deception might 
be necessary to preserve the judiciary’s authority when the political 
branches resist the courts’ judgments,340 the political branches have 
not done so concerning structural defects. 
When the Court is not forthright about the limitations 
concerning, or absence of, a meaningful remedy, it undermines its 
attempt to signal the safeguard’s importance. A first principle of 
remedial theory is that “the remedy should be selected and measured 
to match [the substantive] policy.”341 When courts speak in powerful 
terms of a safeguard but then provide only a limited remedy without 
explaining the reasons for the limitation, they are narrowing the 
safeguard without registering any form of protest or otherwise 
explaining the necessity of doing so.342 Not only does the relatively 
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inconsequential remedy suggest judicial antipathy toward the right, 
but the lack of candor undermines the judiciary’s authority that 
derives from explaining its decisions.343 In other words, when courts 
employ inadequate remedies for unexplained reasons, they weaken 
both the safeguard and themselves.344 Candid judicial recognition of 
its under-effective remedies is preferable to an obfuscated doctrine 
for courts, for scholars, and—perhaps most importantly—for 
regulated parties interested in making well-informed litigation 
choices. 
C. Limiting Challenges from Regulated Parties 
Judicial candor about structural remedies’ current and future 
limitations might also lead to a reassessment of a closely related 
issue—regulated parties’ relationship with structural safeguards. 
Although the courts have referred to certain safeguards as “personal 
rights” and implied private rights of action in the Constitution for 
structural challenges, the lack of effective remedies for certain 
safeguards suggests that there is no meaningful personal right at all.345 
Instead, regulated parties have only some kind of ill-defined interest 
or opportunity to register objections that often cannot be fully 
vindicated. 
The fact that familiar remedial values often do not rest as 
comfortably in a structural context supports this view. Compensating 
for past injury is difficult because of immunity and valuation issues. 
Even the most successful specific-performance-like remedy only 
compensates in part because it does not provide compensation for 
litigation and other expenses incurred because of the structural 
defect. Without monetary remedies, providing a regulated party an 
incentive to litigate is difficult because the regulated party is 
uncertain whether any benefit will come from the structural 
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challenge. Indeed, even a victorious challenge may provide the 
prevailing litigant with no substantive advantage. And deterrence 
may be an inappropriate value in the structural-defect context 
because the Court’s doctrine is ever shifting, rendering Congress less 
blameworthy in failing to adhere to structural limits, and because 
Congress may not respond to deterrence-based remedies anyway.346 
Moreover, a determination of whether these values are satisfied will 
often be subjective and highly indeterminate. These difficulties may 
reveal judicial inattention to structural remedies. Or they could 
suggest that the courts’ understanding of the current relationship 
between legal safeguards and the regulated parties is unsound.347 
Perhaps, instead, only the branches of government themselves 
should have the ability to enforce those structural safeguards for 
which regulated parties can secure no meaningful remedies. The 
structural safeguards, after all, protect the three branches from one 
another.348 And the branches often seek, with or without regulated 
parties, to vindicate the safeguards in litigation.349 Limited structural 
remedies for the branches may also be appropriate because the Court 
can respect the norm largely without considering key remedial values 
that matter to a “wronged” party. For instance, the President usually 
loses power when legislation violates the norms of presidential 
supervision under Article II or disregards the Appointments Clause. 
But he or she (or his or her predecessor)—outside of the rare context 
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of Congress overriding a President’s veto—participated in creating 
the problem by signing the legislation in the first instance.350 A 
minimalist remedy that removes the structural defect and otherwise 
leaves the parties where they were may well be the most appropriate 
remedy to account for the “prevailing” branch’s part in creating its 
own injury. 
Regulated parties may be left with, at best, some kind of interest 
that they have standing to assert, but for which they are not entitled 
to any meaningful remedy. This interest—somewhere between a right 
and nothing at all—may be all that a regulated party can hope to have 
in structural safeguards. If structural remedies remain inadequate, 
scholars, courts, and litigants should begin to consider how remedies 
for regulated parties directly affect their interest in these safeguards 
and how to respond appropriately.  
CONCLUSION 
At their core, the remedial inadequacies for structural challenges 
reveal that the Supreme Court is approaching a crossroads. It has 
appeared receptive to regulated parties’ structural challenges in the 
past two decades, rarely failing to exalt the U.S. Constitution’s 
structural safeguards and encouraging regulated parties to assert 
structural claims. But the remedies that courts have forged, by 
ignoring remedial values relevant to regulated parties, have often 
failed to match judicial paeans to the centrality of structural norms. 
As structural litigation and inadequate structural remedies continue 
to proliferate, the limited nature of structural remediation will 
become only more apparent. By considering remedial values more 
carefully now, all relevant players—courts, scholars, and regulated 
parties—can decide how best to move forward. 
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